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1. INTRODUCTION  
1. 1. Transhumanism 
The discipline of transhumanism is becoming increasingly popular within academic circles. 
Scholars from various disciplines within the humanities are showing keen interest in disciplines 
such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, molecular electronics, computation, robotics, cognitive 
and neuroscience and other similar areas1. Their objectives as well as approaches are very 
different, but most of them merge in their attempt to anticipate certain consequences of emerging 
technologies and their influence on human lives. The number of campaigns, workshops and 
conferences that are related to the topic of transhumanism is increasing each year worldwide, and 
so is the endeavor to introduce the issue to national parliaments. Members and associates of 
organizations such as “Humanity+”2, “Kurzweil Accelerating Intelligence”3, and “The Institute 
for Ethics and Emerging Technologies”4 have been actively promoting and advocating for the 
ethical use of emerging technologies for purposes of improving human capacities and lives in 
general. Longevity Parties are being established continually around the world (currently the most 
active are in The United States and Russia), as is the case with International Longevity Alliances 
and similar organizations, whose membership is increasingly growing. Singularity University5 is 
                                                 
 
1 The reverse is also true – scientists are engaging in, for example, public debates on ethics and new found 
interest in the search for meaning (of coexistence with anticipated artificial intelligence, even the meaning of life, 
and similar investigations) has emerged.  
2 The organization was initially established as the “World Transhumanist Association” in 1998, and has since 
then organized numerous conferences entitled “TransVision” in The United States and Europe. “H+” magazine has 
also been published quarterly since 2008.  
3 Kurzweil Accelerating Intelligence (KurzweilAI) is an on-line journal which further investigates the 
concepts about which Ray Kurzweil has written in his books “The Age of Spiritual Machines” (Kurzweil, 1999) and 
“The Singularity is Near” (Kurzweil, 2006). The core concept of Kurzweil's books is related to an exponential 
development of information-based technologies and the effect they have on lives and the world. For further 
information, please see http://kurzweilai.net.  
4 Members of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (IEET) are devoted to questioning the 
ethical issues raised by the increased usage of new technologies, as well as to anticipating the impact of emerging 
technologies on human beings. The members advocate for ethical approaches to technologies and insist that the 
orientation of the institute be technoprogressive (which is an opposed (biopolitical) point of view to 
bioconservative). For further information, visit http://ieet.org  
5   Established by Ray Kurzweil, Peter Diamandis, Robert D. Richards, among others, Singularity University is a 
private educational institution located in northern California, US.  
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another important landmark for scholars devoted to the investigation of the influence that new 
and emerging technologies have on lives, with tens of dozens of conferences organized each year 
around the world. The funding and sponsorship these organizations receive on an annual basis is 
immense, which testifies to the interest that international corporations have in this issue. 
Transhumanists are also active in processes of law formation and have influenced numerous 
legislative acts.6 Transhumanism relies to great extent also on both biopolitics and necropolitics7, 
and the influence of these lines of theoretical thought is of great importance.  
 As a relatively new but nevertheless increasingly popular (also) academic discipline, 
transhumanism therefore necessarily needs an attentive critical analysis of its certain aspects. As 
an academic discipline that is concerned with the improvement of human lives by relying on 
achievements in biotechnology, nanotechnology, cognitive and neuroscience, it secures human 
(or rather, already transhuman) supremacy over other forms of life8. On the other hand, 
transhumanism is imbued with a kind of anxiety, or even existential fear of the posthuman 
subjectivity that may emerge during the process of development of these technologies. This fear 
is caused by the potential threat of causing a “technocalypse”, which is immanent in the 
posthuman subjectivity. This fear is also related to the loss of dominance and supremacy, which 
would in this case belong to this new form of intelligent life. Paradoxically, the fearful event of 
                                                 
 
6 Probably the most famous figure is Francis Fukuyama, who was a member of the US President’s Council 
on Bioethics in 2003 together with Greg Stock, and has influenced law formation through lectures and debates about 
the consequences of developing human enhancements and posthuman projections. During these debates, Fukuyama 
has taken a bioconservative perspective, while Stock's arguments had a technoprogressive orientation.  
7 South African theoretician Achille Mbembe and Slovenian artist and writer Marina Gržinić together with 
some other scholars write about the impossibility of theoretizing biopolitics after the attacks of September 11th, 
2001, and about the need of developing further the concept of necropolitics and necropower, which are both 
described through attentive reading of Foucault's formulation of the concepts of biopolitics and biopower. Gržinić 
has described necropolitics as the perspective that “regulates life through the perspective of death, transforming life 
into a mere existence, below every life minimum”; and necropower as “a sovereign power that is set up for 
maximum destruction of persons and the creation of deathscapes that are unique forms of social existence in which 
vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (Marina Gržinić , 
lecture “Knowledge Smuggling!, Belgrade, 12/09/2009).  
8 And forms of non-life as well – but this now has to be read in a new light: animate versus inanimate in the 
context of new and emerging technologies would be a whole another topic and a thesis in itself, and thus thorough 
analysis will not be devoted to the topic here. Nevertheless, among authors who have written about such topics are 
professor Willard McCarty, Bill Joy, etc. The supremacy of the transhuman is extended over the supremacy that 
humans have had over non-human animals and repressed and subordinate (cultural) categories of humans. Thus, 
these categories are even more radically excluded from what is now perceived as acceptable, decent, desirable 
(members of a society).  
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the arrival of posthuman subjectivity, a technocalypse, is simultaneously celebrated by members 
of the other stream of transhumanism – by technophiles, for whom the arrival almost implies a 
tone of messianicity. Majority of transhumanist debates are related to the question of whether or 
not cognitive and moral enhancements limit freedom, as well as to the fact that scientific and 
technological progress are regulated by the laws of the market economy. Finally, each 
transhumanism-related discussion is necessarily related to bioethics and neuroethics. 
 
1. 2. Otherness 
At the heart of each bioethical or neuroethical discussion is the question that concerns the 
encounter with otherness. To act ethically means to act responsibly towards the other being, no 
matter how different it is. Exactly this aspect of transhumanism is the one to which attentive 
analysis will be devoted in this thesis, since it is among core problems of transhumanism – the 
problem of otherness.  
 The problem of otherness has been present throughout almost the whole history of 
(theoretical) thought. The most well known modern (re)thinking of the issue began after 1950, 
with Emmanuel Levinas’ writings on the ethic of the Other, developed in his work “Totality and 
Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority”(1969). Levinas' ethical standpoint implies the need for a 
responsible approach to the other – which is always a radically different, incomprehensible other 
person – thus, the other human being. The ultimate, radical other, whose chronotopes cannot be 
comprehended nor his or her thoughts ever properly and correctly translated and understood, can 
be any other human being. Nevertheless, throughout the history, numerous examples of the 
othering of not just any other subject, but those belonging to particular cultural categories, have 
emerged. Members of races that are not Caucasian have been subordinate and seen as radically 
different and therefore simply of less value for centuries. The othering of non-white persons has 
been a foundation for the enslavement and elimination of innumerable people worldwide. After 
the formation of nation-states, members of other nationalities have been seen as ultimate others, 
as threats (even to the purity of one nation). Two World Wars with innumerable conflicts on 
nearly every continent have taken millions of lives, and the dread that is the legacy of ethnic 
cleansing and genocide has left its mark on the lives of those who survive. Class based othering 
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has produced immense gaps between peoples’ quality of life, and so has gender and age based 
othering. 
 Discourses on otherness have become increasingly popular in the second half of the 
twentieth century, after the turbulent period of World Wars, the Cold War, decolonialization, and 
after the intensive fight of women for their rights and for full inclusion in society, after the 
rethinking of the stratification of society into classes, of the separation of the world after WWII 
into eastern and western blocs, and after the 1960s produced a “rich, developed North” and a 
“poor, underdeveloped South”. 
 The second half of 20th century is marked by a subtle turn in the understanding of radical 
alterity. Jacques Derrida has written about the non-human animal as the ultimate other, whose 
aspirations, needs and chronotopes can never be perceived or understood. Together with “the 
animal”, the figure of the monster has been constructed and theoretized as even more radically 
different to the human than even the animal. Finally, transhumanist theoretization of the arrival 
of the posthuman may be seen as the latest permutation in the understanding of the notion of 
radical alterity. The posthuman other is seen as that which is both threatening and whose arrival 
can bring liberation and improve the conditions of life. But the transhuman self has another other 
that precedes it – the human – over whom it has claimed supremacy. The problematic aspect of 
the relationship between human and transhuman is related to the issue of boundaries, and the 
important question is as follows: how many cognitive or body prostheses does it take for a 
human to be considered a transhuman? Does nine still retain a person’s humanity, but ten already 
constitute a transhuman? Such questions have been the topic of lively debates for the previous 
three or four decades, and it seems no answer can be wrong. One stream of theoreticians claims 
that wearing contact lenses for the improvement of vision and usage of the internet makes 
transhumans (or even cyborgs), while theoreticians of the other stream are prone only to accept 
more complicated prostheses as a measurement of transhumanness.  
 Finally, theoreticians devoted to posthumanism, the discipline that is devoted to a critical 
rethinking of humanism, invite the expansion of the concepts of otherness and alterity 
(Marchesini 2010: 91). Marchesini claims that notions of otherness and alterity are also too 
narrow and calls for the replacement of the divergence-expulsion model of identity which 
correlates to humanistic paradigm by a dialectical-integrative model, which would fit with 
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posthumanist endeavors to include other forms of life than the human into the scope of its theory 
(Marchesini 2010: 92).  
 
1. 3. A brief terminological clarification 
As both transhumanism and posthumanities (and posthumanism) are relatively new fields, and 
their properly standardized terminology or methodologies do not really exist as of yet, a brief 
terminological explanation is needed, in order for any sort of confusion to be avoided.  
To begin with, it is necessary to delimit the fields of studies, systems of beliefs and philosophies 
from the objects of studies and the consequences or activities of studies. The first among them, 
and also the most problematic one is humanism – that centuries old perspective, or rather field, 
which as its main focus has human beings, their exceptionality and superiority over other forms 
of life. Humanism has had its several revivals, but for the purposes of this analysis the most 
important is that which is related to the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment and Descartes' 
philosophy. The scope of the humanities encompasses academic disciplines that primarily study 
human culture. Unlike the empirical approach of the majority of the natural sciences, approaches 
characteristic of the humanities are analytical and critical. Among the humanities are disciplines 
such as history, anthropology, languages and linguistics, literature, philosophy, cultural studies, 
arts, law, economics as well as a several other disciplines.  
 Anti-humanism is considered to encompass a set of beliefs and practices which critically 
examine humanism. More than a simple critical reading, anti-humanism is represented by a 
rejection of the core concepts of humanism, such as “Man”, “human nature” and the like.  
 Transhumanism is a movement that as its main objective has the improvement of the 
quality of human life through the enhancement of physical and cognitive capabilities. It is often 
seen as both an ideology and a transitional period between the human and the posthuman. 
Through a wide variety of social, medical and technological practices the objectives of 
transhumanism are achieved.  
The prefix “post-” in posthumanism does not indicate a historical period, nor a rupture or a final 
break with humanism, nor the absence of humanity, but simply rewriting and re-reading of 
humanism. It is a critical practice within humanism, with its main focus on a discourse of human 
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supremacy.  
 Finally, the difference between the objects of these studies must be described. A 
transhuman entity is in a certain sense an improved version of the human, a being whose 
physical and cognitive capabilities are enhanced through the usage of new technologies. 
Cybernetic organisms (cyborgs) that have been created from human beings are often seen as a 
kind of transhuman, but also are war veterans, humans with heart bypasses or any other sort of 
physical or cognitive prostheses. Unlike transhumans, posthumans can never emerge from 
humans. Posthuman entities are those that are yet to come, whose arrival may bring the 
apocalypse: immortal subjects. Posthuman subjectivity is often understood simply as an artificial 
intelligence, self-programming, self-repairing and self-reproducing entities.  
 
1. 4. Problem overview 
 As a discipline that is focused on the improvement of human lives, on a better version of 
the human, transhumanism is not just repeating, but securing the foundation for problematic 
humanist values. The main problem with transhumanism is that it is too humanist, especially in 
the manner in which it deals (or does not deal) with the issue of alterity. Transhuman identity is 
exclusive in relation to other modalities of being, and as such unprepared for the arrival of its 
radical other – of the posthuman. In order for the transhuman to survive the arrival of the 
posthuman, which is simultaneously feared and praised, the transhuman self must be constantly 
engaged in a process of readjusting to this coexistence. The boundaries of the self have to be 
redrawn and the core of the self has to be remodeled. Being must become being-with, and 
notions of community, hospitality and boundary have to be rethought, re-read, rewritten all 
together. Transhumanism must make a devoted endeavor in order to become posthumanist – to 
shrug off the burden of humanism. Transhumanism must attentively reflect on the manner in 
which other disciplines that lean toward posthumanism (animal studies, some approaches to 
gender – Donna Haraway's, for example – and post-colonial studies) have been dealing with such 
issues – first in order not to repeat mistakes that have been made, but also to move beyond (for 
example) three waves (and counting) of re-reading and correcting itself, as is the case with 
gender studies.  
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 The core of the problem of otherness – subjectivity – has to be formulated differently in 
theory and constituted differently in practice.  
 
1. 5. Transhumanism in contemporary culture: a manufacture of consent 
A whole range of concepts and relations today resists being thought outside of those constructs 
that contemporary culture has offered to its audience for decades. Besides the function of an 
artistic expression, literature and cinema have functioned since their inception as tools for the 
manufacture of consent9. Careful reading and analysis of media texts implies research into the 
means in which narration, images, montage and symbolic forms function in the construction of 
ideological representations of cultural categories such as gender, race, religion, etc. Ideological 
layers are inscribed in the literature and cinematographic achievements of a wide variety of 
genres, and they therefore represent an inexhaustible resource for the analysis of ideological 
trends and categories. Unlike literature, cinema and television production use audiovisual 
sources in often unexpected manners in order to seduce audiences and lead them to more than 
mere consent: media texts are reservoirs of positions for identification and manipulate audiences' 
emotions.  
 Science fiction, cyberpunk and recently post-cyberpunk are genres devoted to (among 
other things) the representation of both transhuman and posthuman subjectivity, and their 
relation to humans. For example, movies such as Gattaca (Andrew Niccol, 1997) and adaptations 
of books written by Philip K. Dick10 are among the texts that are the most often analysed 
examples that focus on different aspects of the transhuman, but the scope of analysed media texts 
that are stressing this subject is increasingly growing.  
 
1. 5. 1. Äkta Människor 
Among recent examples is the science fiction and drama television series “Äkta Människor” 
                                                 
 
9 “Manufacture of consent” is a phrase coined by Walter Lippmann at the beginning of the 20th century.  
10 Ridley Scott's “Blade Runner” (1982) is based on the novel “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?” 
(1968), and “Total Recall” (Paul Verhoeven 1990) on Dick's short story “We Can Remember It for You Wholesale” 
(1966)  
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(Real Humans), produced by Swedish national television SVT. The series, written by Lars 
Lundstrom and directed by Harald Hamrell and Levan Akin, had its initial broadcast on January 
22nd, 2012. During the following year, the series was distributed in more than fifty countries and 
has gained a huge audience. This series is a proper example of how the manufacture of consent 
to the (potential) inclusion of non-human otherness (both transhuman and posthuman) into a 
society is gradually created. What distinguishes this series from the other similar media products 
is a manner in which the question of otherness is treated, as designated with a huge seal of 
political correctness, characteristic of Swedish media.  
 The narrative takes place in a near future, if not a parallel present, in Sweden. Everyday 
life is unimaginable without the use of consumer-level android robots – hubots – which are 
available on the market in the form of domestic help –  servants and workers – but also as 
companions. Early advocates in Swedish society have eagerly welcomed hubots, while members 
of the organization “Real Humans” fight for the prohibition of the usage of hubots, since they are 
seen as a threat in the sense that they may replace humans as workers, friends, parents and 
similar roles; ”Real Humans” puts great effort into the endeavor of preserving human purity. The 
problem emerges when a group of several “liberated” hubots organizes a fight for freedom, a 
revolution that includes the liberation of other hubots. Leo (Andreas Wilson) is the first 
transhuman and son of the creator of hubots, who has been brought back to life after an accident 
with the help of technology. His fellow revolutionary hubots have never been humans, but are 
capable of feeling emotions and pain (which has throughout the history of science fiction often 
been the “reliable sign” of humanness), of having independent thoughts and of living without a 
human owner. The first season of the series ends with a cliffhanger, at the peak of the hubot 
revolution. The second season is not expected to be broadcast until the autumn of 2013, but 
nevertheless this incomplete narrative offers numerous scenes and dialogues that can be seen as a 
tool for the manufacture of consent.  
 Of particular interest is a dialogue that Inger (Pia Halvorsen), the mother of a family that 
owns hubot Mimi (Lisette Pagler) (who has lost her memory of being liberated before she has 
been reprogrammed), and who was initially against the very existence of hubots, has with her 
husband Hans (Johan Paulsen), who wants their family to get rid of their hubot. Inger wants to 
help to Mimi to hide from the members of the “Real Humans” organization, who are now trying 
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to destroy hubots. Inger insists on Mimi staying with them until the danger is over, and advocates 
for the rights of this now already posthuman subject, claiming that society is treating hubots in 
the same manner it once treated slaves, women, animals and even children and foreigners: as 
their subordinates and “help”.  
 Ingrid's argument offers a parallel with the way radical otherness has been perceived 
throughout the history of thought, and thus makes this series worthy example of how this issue is 
relevant for and represented in contemporary culture, as well as proper material to support the 
objectives of the current analysis. Inger calls for the inclusion of liberated hubots (posthumans) 
in families and in human society, for unconditional hospitality and the reinvention of a 
community of humans and non-humans. This is what makes this dialogue a proper background 
for the current analysis – thus further methodology can be described.  
 
 
1. 6. Methodology 
In order to analyse and understand better the radically different other of the transhuman self, 
Derrida's theoretization of the impossibility of knowing, comprehending and predicting the 
future, as well as his description of the instance that is yet-to-come proves most suitable. His 
notion of à-venir (that which is yet to come) supports an understanding of how the impossibility 
of anticipating the future is the necessary condition of the possibility of the future. 
Understanding of the concept of à-venir helps to clarify another of Derrida's notions relevant for 
purposes of current analysis - that of l’arrivant – of the radically different other that is in a 
constant process of emergence, possibly without ever realizing itself. Both à-venir and l’arrivant 
belong to Derrida's seminal works, seen as pillars of deconstruction, which implies a peeling of 
the layers of meaning – which is a semiotic endeavor par excellence.  
 Further, a rethinking of the notion of community between the transhuman and its 
otherness and of the act of hospitality (offered by the transhuman to the posthuman) is necessary. 
Jean-Luc Nancy's effort to transform existence into a coexistence and being into being-with are 
seen as that which logically follows Derridian thought on l’arrivant and hospitality, and for 
numerous other reasons as well this is useful for the purposes of this analysis. A different reading 
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of community implies ultimate hospitality for the ultimate other, and coexistence as the only 
possible manner of being-with-the-other.  
 Finally, this brings us to the need for the redrawing of the boundaries of the self, which 
implies the need for translation of content from one side to the other. Yet another deconstruction 
(of the notion of boundaries) seems to be fertile approach, and Derrida's rethinking of aporia(s) 
offers insights into how boundaries can (or should) now be read. Redrawing the boundaries of 
the self also implies the remodeling of the core of the self, and compatible with Derrida's 
deconstruction for these purposes is Juri Lotman's model of semiosphere, as well as his notion of 
(un)translatability. Semiotization of both the transhuman self and posthuman other offers new 
insights and possibilities for an anticipated community of future radical alterities.  
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2. PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the problem under consideration by emphasizing 
problematic aspects of humanism that are also present in transhumanism, as well as the need for 
firmer methodological grounds for transhumanism. The delimitation of fields of studies from 
systems of beliefs offered in this chapter, as well as more detailed description of the objects of 
studies of those disciplines, contributes to the overall content by making the further analysis 
more comprehensible. This chapter focuses on Cartesian humanism and its critique, as well as on 
rethinking the notion of identity in the light of an expanded concept of alterity. Finally, certain 
aspects of animal studies (which belong to the scope of posthumanities) that are repeated by 
transhumanism are emphasized, in order to describe how the same matrices have been reused by 
various disciplines.  
 Exponential speeds of the development of technology as well as manners in which we 
relate to them and implications they have on a society require attentive inquiry. Increasingly 
popular transhumanism, a movement, a system of beliefs and field of study within humanities, 
appears as one of problematic approaches. With its focus on the enhancement of human life and 
on its values, it appears to be too humanist, and thus very problematic11. A fear (immanent in 
writing and speeches of those transhumanists who hold on blindly to the humanist legacy) of the 
posthuman future may be reduced to an old philosophical problem of radical alterity, since it is 
related to a fear of the posthuman other that may compromise human supremacy and thus bring 
apocalypse. The problem of alterity or otherness is necessarily related to problem of subjectivity. 
In order to coexist with the posthuman other, both transhuman and human subjectivity have to be 
less humanist, less essentialist: they have to become posthumanist. 
 A wide variety of fields within humanities have approached this issue from different 
angles. Many of the fields that have tackled the influence of emerging technologies on 
contemporary society as well as the emergence of the posthuman other and coexistence with it, 
are relatively new. A lot of confusion is arising from the absence of firm methodological 
                                                 
 
11 Though humanism is often thought of as a politically indispensable foundation of egalitarian movements, it 
has come to appear problematic due to its anthropocentrism and unethical treatment of the non-human other.  
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foundations and clear delimitation of objects of studies. Lack of properly standardized 
terminology is another significant issue and a cause of numerous contradictory usages. A proper 
critique of these aspects of transhumanism requires reflection on the background field, 
humanism, with the focus on particular instances relevant for such critique. It also requires a 
delimitation of fields of study from systems of beliefs and philosophies; as well as a clear 
distinction between objects, consequences and activities of studies. In order to argue why 
transhumanism is considered to be too humanist and why this is so problematic, terminological 
confusion has to be clarified. To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish the transhuman from 
the posthuman, humanism from transhumanism and posthumanism, as well as delineste various 
approaches to the issue.  
 
2. 1. Humanism 
Humanist ideas have their origins in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. They have been 
revived in different periods from the Renaissance to 18th century Neo-Classicism and the 
Enlightenment and Industrial ages. Each of the revival periods of humanism was designated as 
its peak and relied on similar foundations. Within academic discourse, the humanities encompass 
(human) achievements within the fields of science, philosophy, art and language. The humanities 
contribute to the wider discourse of humanism.  
 Humanism emphasizes the value of human beings, rationalism and especially empiricism. 
Man is at the center of things and is essentially ontologically distinct from and superior to the 
non-human. Humanism is a philosophy or a system of beliefs that relies on Protagoras' maxim 
“Man is the measure of all things”. For Romans, term humanitas was used to distinguish those 
activities proper only to men from those also proper to animals. The maxim was very influential 
during the Renaissance, since it implied diminishing the role of God. Moreover, the role of God 
has been in a sense replaced by a new godlike figure: universal Mankind.  
 Eclectic reinterpretations of classical philosophy together with the emphasis on the value 
of human beings has bred the humanist ideal: the man, independent and free-spirited, who 
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develops his12 mental abilities through questioning conventional beliefs as well as through 
gaining new knowledge, both scientific and artistic. Humanists stood out as a separate social 
layer consisting of aristocrats, scientists, rulers and artists – an elite. Humanism during the Early 
modern period meant a rebirth of both the sciences and arts in Europe.  
 During 17th and 18th century, Europe and the rest of the (civilized) world entered a period 
described as the “Age of Reason”. In addition to the original humanist empiricism and 
rationalism, intellectuals of this cultural movement insisted on skepticism and the scrutiny of 
dominant ideas, especially religious ones. They fought against ignorance. Paradoxically, the 
emancipation of the human mind, together with the progressive development of society, has laid 
the foundation for numerous repressive social norms.  
 
2. 1. 1. Descartes' humanism: I think, therefore I am 
Humanism is a centuries-old concept developed by numerous thinkers throughout history. For 
the purposes of this work, not all approaches are equally relevant. Cartesian thought must be 
looked at more attentively, since it offers an excellent starting point for the analysis of non-
human alterity. 
 The publication of René Descartes' “A Discourse on the Method” in 1637 was of crucial 
importance for the Age of Reason. In this work, Descartes writes about what it means to be 
human. As a key feature of humanness, that which separates Man from beast, he mentions 
reason. The Cartesian version of humanism has been highly influential throughout the history of 
thought, and it is essential for understanding the chasm that has been constructed between the 
human and  the non-human. Descartes writes: “I think, therefore I am”, and thus endows Man 
with the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood13. It should be noted that Descartes was 
searching for things about which he could be absolutely certain, due to his motivation by the 
principle of universal doubt.  
                                                 
 
12 Even though I consider the issue of usage of gender sensitive linguistic forms of great importance, I have 
decided to use word “his” at this place. Humanism derives its ideas from ancient Greece and until recently 
humanism generally excluded everything falling outside the  categories of white, western men.  
13 Truth and falsehood are, generally, rather associated with the truth value of propositions, not with 
metaphysical certitude for Descartes.  
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He also engages in an exhaustive work establishing the basis of existing binary oppositions; not 
just those between truth and falsehood, but especially the opposition between the rational mind 
(or soul) and the body:  
[..] I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist; and that on the contrary, simply because I was 
thinking about doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed; 
whereas, if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had imagined had been true, I should 
have had no reason to believe that I existed; I knew from there that I was a substance whose whole essence 
or nature is solely to think, and who, in order to exist, does not require any place, or depend on any material 
thing. (Descartes 2006: 29). 
Descartes insists on humans being single and complete entities that stand in opposition to the 
non-human, which is, unlike the human, incapable of either understanding itself or of having 
rational thoughts. Moreover, humans are capable of distinguishing themselves from the non-
human. This problematic description of non-human (mostly cognitive) capabilities, or rather, 
incapabilities, includes the usage of signs and language, conveying thoughts and some other 
related (in)capabilities. Descartes underlines intellectual superiority of humans:  
[...] For it is very remarkable fact that there are no men so dull-witted and stupid, not even madmen, that 
they are incapable of stringing together different words, and composing them into utterance through which 
they let their thoughts be known; and, conversely, there is no other animal, no matter how perfect and well 
endowed by birth it may be, that can do anything similar. Nor does this arise from lack of organs, for we 
can see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak like us, that is, by showing 
that they are thinking what they are saying; whereas men born deaf and dumb, who are deprived as much 
as, or more than, animals of the organs which in others serve for speech, usually invent certain signs to 
make themselves understood by those who are their habitual companions and have the time to learn their 
language. (Descartes 2006: 47) 
Descartes, thus, lays firm foundations for a formation of human “us” that is opposed to the non-
human “them”. This is an intentionally plural inclusion and exclusion14, since human beings are 
brought together by the common essence that they share. The human and the non-human stand as 
different, discontinuous, pure.  
                                                 
 
14 The plural division between “us” and “them” here is more suitable than singular one between “I” and 
“you”, since it refers to a community of humans which share a common essence (humanness), as opposed to the 
community of non-humans.  
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 From the Industrial age on, the glorification of human values and progress continued to 
increase. The beginning of the 20th century was distinguished by achievements in physics and 
chemistry, Schoenberg's atonality and modernism in art. Faith in humanity had its peak, but was 
soon challenged by disasters brought by the two World Wars. Achievements in nuclear physics, 
biology and chemistry also resulted in nuclear, biological and chemical weapon of mass 
destruction. Half a century later, weapons of mass destruction have been replaced by a certain 
kind of knowledge of mass destruction, encouraged by achievements within the fields of 
robotics, genetics and nanotechnology. Both weapons and knowledge of mass destruction were 
of crucial importance for the peak of the aforementioned process of othering between “us” and 
“them”. Not only was the non-human considered a threat, but all other sorts of differences 
among human beings were also not acceptable.  
 
2. 1. 2. Post-structuralist criticism 
Just as humanism encompasses endless numbers of pages written about the widest varieties of 
related issues throughout its history, its critique is equally exhaustive. Aspects of French post-
structuralist theory are very closely related to posthumanism, and thus are of great importance 
for this work. When it comes to a critique of humanism, approaches are divided: one strain has 
offered a critique with an apocalyptic tone and an attempt at an absolute break with humanism; 
the other, represented in Derrida's work, calls for a new writing of humanism and also implies a 
rethinking of the first strain of critique.  
 The starting point for the critique of French post-structuralist theoreticians of the first 
strain is the notion that humanism can neither think difference nor can think differently, that it is 
unable to imagine the Other that is opposed to the rational human mind. After the death of God, 
it was necessary for Man to die as well. Anthropocentrism was threatened by the disappearance 
of Man. This is a position that Lévi-Strauss takes when he states in “The Savage Mind” that “(.) 
the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute, but to dissolve Man” (Lévi-Strauss 
1972: 245).  
His position is very close to that of Roland Barthes, for whom humanism at its core hinders 
difference, knowledge and change. For him, there are certain similarities between humanism and 
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myths, since both rest upon a pre-established order of things and practices that endow them with 
inevitability. Thus, not only the non-human but different sorts of otherness are considered to be 
unnatural and unthinkable. In Barthes' opinion, humanism has to be demythilogized: “ () there is 
nothing “obvious” about the human as such, instead there is only a “discourse” - humanism – 
that is trying, through the construction of “myths,” or through “mystification/mythification,” to 
legitimate a hierarchical system in which the human manages to retain its absolute supremacy by 
expelling differences outside its “own” category and projecting them onto constructed “others,” 
i.e., non-humans” (Herbrechter, Callus 2008: 100). 
 On the other hand, Derrida was reluctant to accept this absolute break with tradition and 
the disappearance of Man, considering it to be a kind of false exit from humanism. His critique is 
directed towards the fact that this absolute break with humanism continues to carry its inside, the 
rupture only means reaffirmation of humanism. Still, he is of an opinion that humanism bears 
necessity of its own critique. Derrida’s critique is not only directed towards Barthes' and Lévi-
Strauss, but also towards Foucault's anti-humanism, implicit in “The Order of Things”, claiming 
that the thought always bear certain traces of humanist tradition regardless of it being on a 
different side of the established order of things (Derrida 1978: 31). Put simply, Derrida suggests 
that a concept such as the disappearance (or the end) of Man bears traces of the humanist 
tradition since it is only possible and meaningful due to that tradition. Thus, the end of Man is 
always-already designated by the language of Man. It is important to notice that, in this sense, 
humanism cannot be overcome by celebrating the non-human, because in this case the human 
will continue to haunt. It is exactly this dialectic between haunting and examination that 
maintains the humanist hegemony. 
 Derrida by no means advocates for the necessity of a reappearance of humanism. 
Nevertheless, he does attempt to explain that a unique solution for challenging anthropocentrism 
does not exist, and calls for engagement in a new writing of humanism.   
 
2. 1. 3. Humanism and identity: the need for expansion of the concept of alterity 
This is where the humanist approach to the issue of identity appears as one of the most 
problematic aspects of humanism. The endeavor to incorporate the non-human into the 
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dimension of the human calls for a necessary focus on the dialectic of alterity and identity within 
the human being itself. For centuries, a person's identity was considered to be a pure, isolated 
and unique entity. Roberto Marchesini refers to this humanist model as the divergence-expulsion 
model (Marchesini 2010: 92) of identity. He believes that this model results in a weakening of 
identity, which is deprived of contributions from the interchange with alterity. The divergence-
expulsion model implies identities that are clearly delimited, stable, and fixed, and where the 
process of identification is a process of purification and separation. Once again, the most 
problematic presumption of humanism appears – that of absolute human autonomy. This 
autonomy is achieved thorough “(.) compressing a plurality of alterities into a single, universal 
idea of alterity” (Marchesini, 2010: 93). 
 Thus Marchesini calls for the expansion of the concept of alterity or otherness, in a sense 
that the humanist construction of the non-human should no longer be characterized by 
universality, since such universality can be “neither a multiplicity nor a bearer of individual 
characteristics, as opposed to the category of humanity which is intrinsically pluralistic” 
(Marchesini 2010: 93).  He suggests that after the 1970s, a dramatic shift in understanding the 
conception of identity occurred. The dialectical-integrative model has replaced the old 
divergence-expulsion model. The new model integrates other entities and qualities. Alterity is 
“no longer a contaminant to be purged” (Marchesini 2010: 91) but a desired quality. This model 
is exactly the instance that has opened the way to identities that are hospitable, i.e., to ontological 
pluralism. In the new kind of identity external references are integrated, which is its main 
strength. There are no more prototypes more relevant or significant than others, and diversity is 
considered valuable for its ability to create various alternatives. The identity that diverges from 
the prototype is no longer subjected to marginalization through being deviant and inferior.   
 
2. 2. Posthumanism  
Roberto Marchesini considers “alterità non humane15” to be the crucial issue for posthumanism 
(Marchesini 2010: 91). By broadening the concept of otherness and discrediting the humanist 
                                                 
 
15 Non-human otherness  
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divergence-expulsion model of identity, Marchesini in a sense responds to Derrida's call for a 
“new writing” of humanism. He writes about a crisis of humanism and refers to posthumanist 
discussions. Those universalist, essentialist and moral values of the Western ideology that have 
been  more or less dominant for five centuries have indeed entered into crisis.  
 Another type of new writing of humanism has been offered by Neil Badmington, who 
suggests that humanism unwittingly becomes the other to itself, posthumanism. He proposes a 
posthumanism that will not be “afraid to tackle the traces of humanism that haunt contemporary 
western culture” (Badmington 2004: 144). The main task of posthumanism should therefore be 
the reconsideration of the end of Man: challenging humanism, that hegemonic system of beliefs, 
and its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings, such as essentialism, universalism, 
anthropocentrism and speciesism.  
 Posthumanism should by no means be seen as a historical period. The prefix “post-” thus 
does not designate a break with humanism, nor an end, a rupture, or a novelty. The “post-” in 
posthumanism also does not imply the absence of humanity, especially not one that would be the 
result of a certain movement “beyond”, in either a biological or evolutionary sense. It designates 
working-through. Posthumanism does therefore not come after humanism, but inhabits it.  
 Posthumanism implies a rewriting of humanism, which is “constitutionally and 
ceaselessly pregnant” (Badmington 2004: 120) with posthumanism, as Badmington compares it 
to a relation between modernism and postmodernism. Just like that of postmodernism, the 
history of posthumanism does not have a precisely located beginning or end within the history of 
philosophical thought. Neither can it be considered anti-humanist, since anti-humanism is also 
too humanist.  
 Posthumanism is (or rather, should be) a critical practice within humanism, a practice 
whose main focus is anthropocentric discourse. Put simply, it is an investigation of what has 
been omitted from anthropocentric discourses. Posthumanism, thus, should be a study of the 
collapse of ontological boundaries. Posthumanism does not imply the end of Man, but rather the 
end of the (hu)man centered world-view. It implies a critique of the arrogant belief in human 
uniqueness and superiority.  
 The state of being human has been considered anything but natural – for to stay human, 
we have to engage our minds in culture. Culture is, paradoxically, that which guarantees human 
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nature. It follows that it should rather be spoken of as the state of becoming human. Following 
this line of thought, Badmington suggests that posthumanism is also always becoming, and not 
something stable, present or instantly graspable (Badmington 2004: 145). Herbrechter and Callus 
even rephrase Latour, claiming that “we have never been human” (Herbrechter, Callus 2008: 
104).  
 One of the tasks of posthumanism should be to rethink Cartesian dualisms – between 
human and non-human as much as between mind and body, which reemerges as a very 
problematic one as well.  
 The first problem that appears within posthumanist criticism is of course related to the 
position of one who criticizes humanism: what kind of analytical detachment in relation to 
humanity is necessary in order for the critique of humanist values not to be determined by this 
position? Herbrechter and Callus suggest that “(t)o read in a posthuman way is to read against 
(...) one's own deep-seated self-understanding as a member or even representative of a certain 
“species” (Herbrechter, Callus 2008:95). This would mean that criticism requires a position that 
would at the same time be one of identity and of otherness. In a sense, posthumanist 
investigations of humanist assumptions can easily fall into the traps of tautology and redundancy, 
since the detachment from the investigator's position (that of human) is hardly possible. 
Posthumanist criticism implies indicating the implicit humanism of texts written under the 
pretense of being its critique, of exactly those texts that investigate what has been omitted by 
humanism. Posthumanism, therefore, should not aspire to redefine what it means to be human, 
nor to be dehumanizing. The discipline should, on the other hand, be able to identify the 
opposition between human and non-human in texts as well as in various practices, thus 
preventing the essentialist determination between the two categories from appearing and being 
maintained. Posthumanist readings should aim “to show that another and less defensive way of 
thinking about the human in its posthuman forms and disguises, and in its implications within the 
posthumanising process, may be not only possible but pre-inscribed within texts” (Herbrechter, 
Callus 2008: 97). 
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2. 3. Terminological confusion 
After outlining humanist premises that have limited the field in question to a narrow 
anthropocentrism and essentialism, posthumanism appears as one of its possible criticisms or 
even alternatives, and certainly is not considered to be a novelty. Nevertheless, due to the fact 
that the non-human encompasses not only animals, but also those entities that have emerged only 
recently as a product of the development of technology, terminological confusion within the field 
was inevitable. Not only is it important to distinguish posthumanism from anti-humanism as is 
done above, but also from other related fields of study, philosophies and systems of beliefs have 
to be described. Clear definitions do not exist as of yet. Various authors tend to use the same 
concepts in order to describe conflicting standpoints. It is impossible to rely on or to refer with 
certainty to any of authors, since many have ignored the issue of setting disciplinary boundaries 
and scope. On the other hand, numerous authors have recently tended to imprudently mis-
categorize works written by other relevant authors.  
 Terminological confusion is to be expected not only due to the fact that these disciplines 
are relatively new, but because this newness implies a lack of methodology or of characteristic 
sets of premises that are needed to delimit a field or to recognize particular issues or approaches 
as belonging to one field or another. The problem for posthumanities is not just delimiting 
methodologies – it is also about how to delimit and describe objects of study, and the activities or 
consequences of such studies. It can be said that the lowest common denominator of different 
approaches to posthumanities, and of those disciplines that operate under the pretense of being 
posthumanities, are concepts such are alterity, becoming, transgression of boundaries and, of 
course, the position of both humanism and humanity with regard to these issues. After describing 
posthumanism as a critical reading of humanism and anti-humanism, it is necessary to also 
describe cultural posthumanism, philosophical posthumanism, philosophy of technology, and, 
finally, transhumanism. Through the process of description of these fields, the objects of study 
that are commonly mistaken and that should be described will appear – notions such as 
transhuman and posthuman. Clarification of the issues that particular fields are concerned with 
will enable a narrowing down of the context that must be described as necessary for the purposes 
of this research. In order for fields to be more easily described, some of their objects of study 
should first be explained. 
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2. 3. 1. Transhuman  
The term “transhuman” was first used by French scientist and philosopher Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin, in his book “The Future of Mankind”. In his book written in 1949, the author deals with 
issues such as democracy, globalization, extraterrestrial life and scientific possibilities of peace 
on Earth. He considers liberty to be an opportunity that each man should have in order to develop 
his personal potential to the fullest – the opportunity to trans-humanize himself (de Chardin 
1949: 238). Other contemporary theoreticians identify ourselves as transhumans, in the sense that 
we are attempting to become posthuman in order to embrace our posthuman future. This state 
involves learning about and using new and emerging technologies in order to expend our 
intellectual capacities as well as to increase life expectancy. In short: to prepare for the future 
through transcendence of obsolete human beliefs and behaviors (Pepperell 2005: 171).  
 Authors vary, from those who consider the habits of using eye glasses in order to improve 
vision or the use of computers as an extension of mind as making us transhuman, to those that 
would rather also include more drastic transgressions of biology by the use of technologies. Peter 
Sloterdijk in his “Critique of Cynical Reason” writes about war veterans as transhumans, whose 
usage of prosthesis was the first step towards disembodied streams of electrons, which he calls 
posthumans (Sloterdijk 1988). 
 The aforementioned television series “Äkta människor” incorporates both transhuman 
and posthuman subjects. One of the main characters, Leo (Andreas Wilson), initially only a 
human, is “repaired” by his father after an accident and has integrated into his body 
technological devices to keep him alive, thus making him a transhuman. Leo is the only 
transhuman in the series, and one of his main purposes is the liberation of other (posthuman) 
hubots, also made by his father.  
 
2. 3. 2. Posthuman  
Theoreization of the posthuman is the anticipation of entities that are yet to come. Posthuman 
subjects are bound to be of radically greater physical and intellectual abilities than both humans 
and transhumans. The posthuman bears the echo of immortality: they will be self-programming 
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and self-repairing, unlimited subjects who have overcame the biological and neurological 
constrains that existed for humans. Pepperell anticipates that posthumans will be “partly or 
mostly biological in form, but will likely be partly or wholly postbiological — our personalities 
having been transferred “into” more durable, modifiable, faster, and more powerful bodies and 
thinking hardware. Some of the technologies that we currently expect to play a role in allowing 
us to become posthuman include genetic engineering, neural-computer integration, molecular 
nanotechnology, and cognitive science” (Pepperell, 2005:171). Artificial intelligence is often the 
first entity to be associated to the posthuman. Because of the possibility of the posthuman to be 
disembodied, many theoreticians have problematized its relation to the Cartesian dualism 
between mind and body. The most well-known are the critiques of Hans Moravec's idea of 
uploading consciousness into a computer or to the internet. This would imply reinforcement of 
the binarity between mind and body, which had to be transcendent due to a popular argument 
that mind emerged from matter.  
 
2. 3. 3. Cultural and philosophical posthumanism  
The fields of cultural and philosophical posthumanism16 overlap in several instances, and thus 
should be comparatively described. 
 The initial writings of the field that could be designated as cultural posthumanism started 
to appear around the middle of the last decade of the previous century. This field is characterized 
by its implementation of different approaches to and discourses of cultural studies within 
posthumanism. The focal point is the analysis of changes that adaptation to current technological 
and scientific achievements bring to subjectivity and (dis)embodiment. The cultural approach to 
posthumanism tends to criticize humanism, expanding and rethinking the concept by weakening 
ontological boundaries between human and non-human. Cultural studies in general have 
emerged in a sense as a response to dissatisfaction with the humanities (Badmington 2006, 260) 
– a shift was needed in order to be able to draw attention to forms and manners of life that had 
been excluded from the scope of interests of universities. The critique is directed towards the 
                                                 
 
16 Posthumanism refers to various academic disciplines, and thus it is important to note that various 
posthumanist approaches take into an account different ultimate others, not only technological.   
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tendency of the humanities to narrow down culture to human culture – to that which is produced, 
reproduced and challenged by Man. The anthropological use of term “culture” affirms the 
superior position of human over non-human, since webs of significance are created and 
interpreted by man in search of meaning, which would in this case be a uniquely human 
characteristic. Badmington suggests that cultural posthumanities would have to extend these 
webs of significance “across the traditional ontological abyss between the human and its others” 
(Badmington 2006, 266).  
 The repression of the question of nonhuman subjectivity is a crucial problem, since 
disciplines within the field of humanities have tended to take for granted the subject as always-
already human, and this is where the field of cultural posthumanism overlaps with the field of 
philosophical posthumanism.  
 Philosophical posthumanism has as its focus the issue of the transgression of ontological 
boundaries. Unlike cultural posthumanism, this field thoroughly stresses the implications of what 
it does (not) mean to be human. Philosophical posthumanism has as its starting point a rethinking 
of the consequences of technological advancement, which is implicit in post-Enlightenment 
skepticism toward the idea that technological advancement is equivalent to progress. 
Philosophical posthumanism criticizes the transhumanist fear of the posthuman, which could be 
a threat to humanity. Within this field, ethical concerns are extended not only to non-human 
animals, but also to automata, embracing them not as separate, threatening species, but as the 
other whose arrival is welcome. Philosophical posthumanism is therefore not just about the 
future, but also about the present.  
 The aforementioned Derridian critique of anti-humanism may be considered to fall within 
the field of cultural posthumanities, but also in that of philosophical posthumanism. Badmington 
writes that what is of crucial importance for both philosophical and cultural posthumanism is the 
shift that was brought about by Haraway in her “Cyborg Manifesto” (Haraway 1991) - in which 
the monadic subject of humanism has been replaced by a nomadic confusion of the organic and 
the inorganic, the natural and cultural (Badmington 2006, 263). Technology can no longer be 
separated from everyday life, thus its influence on culture is incommensurate. Cultural 
posthumanism comes closest to philosophical posthumanism in its critique of the essentialism 
and specieism that permeate humanism. Badmington insists that this new kind of reading would 
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not imply “burning books or bridges” (Badmington 2006, 269), but attentive academic work on 
the expansion of various conceptions beyond them being uniquely and exclusively human.  
 Cultural posthumanism also encompasses the discourses on and the representations of the 
posthuman at work. Besides Neil Badmington's various analysis of the discourses on and the 
representations of the posthuman, several other authors are crucial for both fields in question.  
Donna Haraway's aforementioned work could be designated (also) as cultural posthumanism, 
since her work contributes to a great extent to the weakening of ontological boundaries. She 
analyses how companion species and cyborg ontology are crucial for the abandonment of 
anthropocentric positions. Cyborg ontology is a concept that Haraway develops in her “Cyborg 
Manifesto”, a chapter in a book written for different purposes than those of interest here – that is, 
for the purpose of describing a state of socialist feminism. The author describes the metaphor of 
cyborg both as the gatekeeper of a boundary and the transgressor of boundaries, as a promise of 
subvention of organic wholes and illegitimate fusions. Her critique of socialist feminism is 
founded on a statement that the movement represents yet another tearing down in search for new 
matrices for essentialist identities, and she thus calls for cyborg politics (Haraway 1991) – a 
force that can generate new languages and subvert structures that reproduce the dominant 
categories of identities, as well as transcend binary oppositions.  
 Another important author whose work can be categorized both within the field of cultural 
posthumanism and philosophical posthumanism is N. Katherine Hayles. Hayles' work is focused 
on how the problem of (dis)embodiment is related to crisis of humanism. She analyses relations 
between pleasure, reality and virtuality, as well as relations of power, which she considers to be 
of crucial importance for the construction of transhuman and emerging posthuman bodies 
(Hayles, 1999), and thus this part of her workload can be categorized within the field of cultural 
posthumanism. The author attentively discusses the question of boundaries of bodies, as well as 
the implications of the translation of embodiment into information, and her work is famous for 
the strong critique of disembodied minds, uploaded consciousness and similar conceptions. She 
refers to Moravec's upload of consciousness and thus comes close to problematizing the 
Cartesian duality between body and soul. Therefore, with the critique of humanism as a guiding 
framework, Hayles contributes to the workload written within the field of philosophical 
posthumanism.  
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 Finally, Cary Wolfe's work within the fields of animal studies and posthumanities, which 
is derived from Derrida and Luhmann, can also fit into both varieties of posthumanism, since it 
echoes the transgression of ontological boundaries and the critique of humanist values. Through 
criticism of the work of philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett, Wolfe describes how self-
awareness, boredom, altruism, tool-making and tool-using, friendship and non-verbal language 
can be attributed to non-human animals, not just humans (Wolfe 2010). The position that Wolfe 
takes in his work “Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourses of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory” is very close to that of other cultural posthumanists, and in a sense he paraphrases Peter 
Singer:  
[...] as long as this humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization remains intact, and as long as it is 
institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to systematically exploit and kill non-human animals 
simply because of their species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by 
some humans against other humans as well. (Wolfe 2003: 7-8) 
For both cultural and philosophical posthumanism, the question of otherness is of crucial 
importance. For this question to be properly problematized, first the fields of philosophy of 
technology and transhumanism have to be described.  
 
2. 3. 4. Philosophy of technology  
Even though the field of philosophy of technology is not directly related to the objectives of 
posthumanities, it is necessary to briefly delimit the field and its focus, since some of the issues 
that have been stressed are very important for further inquiries in the field of posthumanism. 
Etymologically, the word 'technology' derives from Greek words techne, skill, art or craft, and 
logos, which in this context relates to study or science. Initially, the word was used to refer to the 
transformation or control of the surrounding natural world. This essentially anthropocentric view 
suggest that man became a noble savage when he started to control and adapt natural resources 
to his own needs. The roots of the inquiry into technology can be found in Plato's “Republic”, 
where the author describes techne as the proper philosophical rule of polis, as well as in 
Aristotle's “Nicomachean Ethics”, where the same term is one of the four manners through 
which humans can perceive the world. Finally, the key work on this topic, “The Question 
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Concerning Technology”, was written in 1945 by Martin Heidegger. The author discusses the 
notion of technology as well as how it influences humanity and the manner in which it helps man 
to reveal the world. Heidegger writes about the transformational effect that technology has on 
human perception, culture, politics, and society in general. His standpoint suggests that 
technology has a strong influence on subjectivity, even though it was long considered only an 
addition and/or adaptation to nature. Heidegger also writes about the concept of enframing, 
which treats technology as a process rather than an artifact (Heidegger 1977: 13). Technology is 
thus considered as a process of revealing specific modes of being. Among other notable authors 
working within the field of philosophy of technology is Jacques Ellul, who wrote about its 
various aspects in his book “A Technological Society”, published in 1964 in France. Neither 
Ellul nor Heidegger ever used term posthumanism. Nevertheless, their ideas are significant for 
various aspects of contemporary posthumanities.  
 
2. 4. Transhumanism  
Pepperell describes transhumanism as a philosophy of life that “seek(s) the continuation and 
acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its currently human form and limits by 
means of science and technology, guided by life-promoting principles and values, while avoiding 
religion and dogma.” (Pepperell, 2005:171) 
 Transhumanism is a movement that aims at enhancement of the quality of human life 
through augmentation of physical and intellectual capabilities, as well as at the extension of its 
duration. It is also often considered to be an ideology, as well as a transitional period between the 
human and posthuman. Wide-ranging social, technological and medical practices related to 
human embodiment are increasingly developing, due to various new resources that are available 
in order to pursue realization of embodiment as an individual project. Among those practices are 
genetic engineering, plastic surgery, hormonal and pharmacological treatments, nanotechnology, 
prosthetics, sport and similar practices. The human body is therefore directly participating in the 
field of the political, and is considered to be a product of the power relations invested in it, those 
same power relations that designate it, involve it in rituals, or, to put it simply: discipline it 
(Foucault 1995).  
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 Numerous transhumanist thinkers have engaged in analysing the challenges and 
advantages of emerging technologies in order to understand how they can be useful for the 
enhancement of human life. What is threatening about emerging technologies are potential 
scenarios of posthuman life taking over the world and bringing both human and transhuman life 
into danger. This approach displays an underlying humanism at its best: it invites the defence of 
humanist values for the sake of maintaining human superiority and uniqueness.  
 Among the supporters of transhumanist movements are numerous public figures from 
around the world, including politicians, scientists, thinkers, pharmacologists and medical 
doctors. Most transhumanists are aware of also contributing to the process of redefining what it 
means to be human. Transhumanism aims at preparing humans for their potential posthuman 
future, for coexistence with posthuman beings, whether they are artificial intelligences or 
something that we cannot yet anticipate. What is interesting about the anticipation of something 
is the fact that it suggests more about the moment in which it is anticipated, than about what is 
expected. While Peter Sloterdijk writes about homo prostheticus, he reminds readers that the 
human body has for some time now functioned as a prosthesis in a society (of work and struggle) 
(Sloterdijk 1992: 432). The author writes about war veterans as the first modern transhumans, 
and emphasizes, in a very humanist tone, that technology is there for men and not the other way 
around. Among further transhumanist developments is professor Kevin Warwick's project 
Cyborg 1.0, in which the professor has achieved success in his use of a chip embedded in his 
body to manipulate other electronic devices in his surroundings. Other transhumanist projects are 
related to work on the achievement of that old dream of robotics: the achievement of immortality 
thorough gradual replacement of body parts with prostheses and robotic technologies and, 
finally, through uploading consciousness.  
 Some transhumanist debates belong to the fields of bioethics and neuroethics, and are 
related to cognitive, body, mood and - the most problematic – moral enhancements. Australian 
theoretician Julian Savulescu defends the thesis that moral enhancements (among which he 
considers Oxytocin and Serotonin injections and the like) do not pose a threat to (trans)human 
freedom by narrowing it down, while the other stream of theoreticians, among whom Peter 
Singer and John Harris are probably the most well known, are of the opposite opinion. Other 
debates are related to issues such as the relation between enhancements and autarchy, procreative 
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altruism, egalitarism and moral enhancements, and the like. Besides the aforementioned, among 
the professors who are most often consulted or invited to give speeches are Professors James 
Hughes of Trinity College, Ingmar Persson and Bennett Foddy of Oxford University, Stefan 
Sorgner of the University of Erfurt, and Robert Sparrow of Monash University. It is significant 
that a majority of transhumanist conferences and symposia are sponsored by pharmacological 
corporations and stem cell banks, and this fact often sets the tone of the conference and in a 
certain sense disables the possibility of really radical critical contributions.  
 The movement has been negatively criticized by numerous theoreticians, among whom 
Francis Fukuyama's critique is the most famous and most problematic. Fukuyama's approach to 
transhumanism brings to the surface those problematic humanist values, due to the fear of a 
potential threat, immanent in the emergence of the posthuman. The most problematic concept 
that he offers is probably Factor X, which implies a human “essence” which is threatened by the 
emergence of enhancements. His approach is from the perspective of political science rather than 
moral philosophy, as Fukuyama has been a member of the United States President's Council on 
Bioethics, and his position has been described as bioconservative. Fukuyama's inquiries within 
philosophy have been instrumentalized for the purposes of policy making (Miah 2007: 4), 
making his theoretical work of great importance. He is concerned with the moral force of human 
rights being threatened by the emergence of transgenic species and thus calls for the 
reestablishment of fundamental humanist values.  
 
2. 4. 1. Transhumanism and the problem of otherness  
The problematic relationship between the human and non-human has already been addressed by 
suggesting the introduction of a dialectical-integrative model of identity. The transhumanist 
endeavor is to improve the human in order to be better prepared for the emergence of and 
coexistence with the posthuman other. This threatening other can thus be designated as an 
ultimate other – that which brings about apocalypse (or rather, technocalypse), which does not 
feel or remember the Biblical Fall, nor hopes to return to Eden. Ultimate alterity arises together 
with Gray Goo – a scenario according to which learning computers could rapidly become super 
intelligent and catalyse a technological singularity. Gray Goo involves molecular 
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nanotechnologies, i.e. self-replicating robots getting out of human control and consuming all 
matter on Earth, including both humans and their environment, in order to provide more 
resources for themselves. Thus the singular other is foreign, unpredictable and out of the control 
of the Man who enabled its emergence. 
 Throughout the history of philosophy, thousands of pages have been written on the 
problem of the constitution of subjectivity and its necessary relation to the Other. Numerous 
works have been written on the idea that the Other (person), in relation to whom one constructs 
the Self, can never be fully understood, fully perceived, and cognized, and that the chasm 
between two selves can never be bridged. By designating the Other, the boundaries of Self are 
established, and therefore the constitution of a modern subject is always done in relation with the 
Other. The Other is always radically different and every attempt at the construction of one’s own 
subjectivity or identity in relation to the Other turns out to be not only threatening but also 
violent, since it has been chosen among many other Others. Every attempt at establishing a 
relationship with the Other means an opening of one’s own boundaries, making them permeable 
and even erasable, and therefore leaving the core unprotected and fragile. The (always radically 
different) Other then threatens to undermine the very essence of the self. Since the chronotopes 
and experiences of the Other can never be comprehended, it remains the Other, the difference. 
 The threat of the posthuman other and the potential collapse of ontological boundaries 
have raised numerous debates within circles of humanist academics. Attempts to determine the 
human essence have been related to notions such as dignity, rights and also personhood and 
subjectivity. Participants in these debates often refer to Montaigne and Descartes in order to 
support their humanist standpoints. The problem of otherness appears most frequently both 
within humanist and posthumanist discussions and is related to the question of ontological, 
moral, political and finally cultural boundaries. Posthumanism is open toward any sort of 
transgression of boundaries and the entities that are gatekeepers of those boundaries. The 
posthumanism approach thus encompasses various inquiries into entities located on the other 
side of the boundary that separates humans from the non-human. Animal studies, as well as 
studies about monstrosities and extraterrestrial life, have tackled topics that also appear on pages 
written about the transhumanist relation to radical alterity. Disciplines that  deal with the non-
human are not the only ones tackling the problem of otherness. For example, gender and 
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postcolonial studies offer exhaustive analyses of how different forms of identity and human 
subjectivity are subordinated and marginalized through social rituals and practices. One 
particularly valuable reflection on this issue has been written by Cary Wolfe, who writes about 
the place of animal studies within the field of cultural studies. His work is of great importance 
for the purposes of the current analysis, since he also describes how animal studies have used the 
templates of other disciplines from the field of cultural studies. Thus, a parallel can be also 
drawn between other non-human entities besides animals, i.e. with both transhumans and 
posthumans. A more attentive analysis of the problem of how another posthumanist discipline – 
animal studies – has gone through the process of inclusion of certain entities has to be 
undertaken.  
Wolfe explains the fact that non-human animals within humanities have only been designated as 
“a theme, trope, metaphor, analogy, representation, or sociological datum” (Wolfe 2009: 567) 
and describes that the animal has been repressed and brought together with other forms of 
discourses and identities that are located at the other side of the boundary. While writing about 
the other identities, he refers to racial, gender, class and sexual identities and for purposes of 
domination. Wolfe describes animal studies as  
the latest permutation of a socially and ethically responsive cultural studies working to stay abreast of new 
social movement (…) which is itself an academic expression of a larger democratic impulse toward greater 
inclusiveness of every gender, or race, or sexual orientation, or – now – species. (Wolfe 2009: 568) 
The author thus refers to “the cultural studies template” that has been reused for purposes of 
animal studies and which might be also reused for purposes of transhumanism, due to the fact 
that both disciplines fundamentally challenge the structure of anthropocentric underpinnings of 
cultural studies. Wolfe describes animal studies as “the latest flavor of the month” (Wolfe 2009: 
569) within the scope of various academic disciplines and practices, many of which are 
designated as studies. The same goes for different aspects of transhumanism – as many of them 
are simply repeating different templates of previously popular disciplines. An effort is thus 
required in order to prevent transhumanism from being repetitive and redundant. This means that 
certain limitations of the current state of affairs in this academic field have to be emphasized. 
That is not to argue that posthuman studies should not rely on studies done within other fields, 
but to insist that it makes little sense to repeat them. Finally, in order to clarify this more 
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thoroughly, description of how this process of the othering of non-human animals has taken 
place and comparison with the process of othering the posthuman has to be undertaken. 
 
2. 4. 2. An example of a template reused by transhumanism: animal studies  
For a long time in the history of the problem of otherness, the radical Other was always thought 
of and written about as of a human being. At some point, it seemed that for centuries 
philosophers have been blind to a whole world of more radically different entities that were 
present all along. And finally, when non-human animals were seen as even more different and 
non-comprehensible than humans, they were treated even more violently. This violence 
reinforced the boundaries between humans and the unitary, singular entity of animals, as 
opposed to the whole universe of potential boundaries that could have been drawn within the 
animal kingdom. This division also points out that by labeling the huge number of living beings 
under a single name, or rather a concept, “animals”, and also speaking of them in the general 
singular, human superiority over the other has been established. Not only were animals subjected 
through the process of naming, but the boundary was finally firmly drawn. 
 The (moralizing) subjection of the other has opened a way to taming, domestication, 
training, discipline and finally, anthropomorphization. The case is also similar to that of 
posthuman visions: in order for the human and the transhuman to survive, the other has to be 
domesticated, tamed, disciplined and (at least) imagined in a familiar shape. 
 The notion of radical alterity as a subordinate entity was the dominant standpoint until the 
moment when Jacques Derrida became ashamed of his nudity under the gaze of his cat. Derrida 
was at that point well aware how misidentifying and possibly misleading a word “animal” is, and 
how this subjection has justified and given to humans authority and power to be violent to 
animals. After describing how this violence has been done through industrial farming and 
biological experimentation and manipulation, all for the sake of the well-being of humans, 
Derrida has introduced expression ecce animot (Derrida 2008), which unlike name the animal 
that delineates the final ethical difference from humans, designates neither a specie nor a gender, 
but is an individual living multiplicity of mortals and a sort of monstrous hybrid, just like the 
chimera that is made of multiplicity of animals. Ecce animot, therefore, is an entity whose 
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identity can only be maintained by a word. The expression he introduced also calls for 
pluralization and for attention to the numerous differences that may distinguish species and their 
sexes – just like aforementioned Haraway's cyborg ontology (Haraway 1991).  
 But then again, if philosophers from Descartes to Lacan have been denying animal the 
power to respond–to pretend, to lie, to cover their own traces (Wolfe 2010), in what way should 
the difference or a gap between humans and non-human animals be constructed now? Even more 
importantly, for what purposes are these differences being constructed? Of course, before 
thinking about the essence of the non-human self, the essence of humanity had to be thought in 
order to be able to once more draw the line that differentiates the two. The human has long ago 
been described as a rational animal17and a promising animal (Nietzsche), and what puts him 
alone behind the boundary now has to be rethought. Any kind of property that may be attributed 
to a non-human animal now would be another attempt in anthropomorphization. Derrida argues 
that properties attributed to animals such as muteness, powerlessness and mourning have once 
again placed humans in a superior position. But after the question “Can it speak?” the one that 
logically followed was “Can it respond, reason or think?”, and the shift that followed was related 
to the fact that these questions determine so many others that actually concern power or 
capability – the questions of being able, having power to do something, and so on (Wolfe 2010). 
Derrida reminds readers of Bentham’s questions of sufferance, of passion, of non-ability – can 
they not-be-able? - by reinterpreting them, and explains this non-ability not as a power, but as 
impossibility, which is the only possibility, the possibility of a non-power (Derrida 2008). When 
it comes to posthuman entities, transhumanist questions about them are always necessarily 
related to their capabilities. And this is the source of (trans)humanist fear of the posthuman Other 
– that the gap between their superior capabilities and those of (trans)human will be  so 
unbridgeable that humanity will lose its supremacy. The loss of human supremacy would, 
obviously, imply apocalypse.  
 The point about human/non-human capabilities is actually of great importance for animal 
studies since it reduces the tension made between the approaches of psychoanalysis and 
                                                 
 
17 It is uncertain from whom the expression originates, but Aristotle, Husserl. Kant, Hegel are among notable 
philosophers who have used it.  
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cognitive science to the question of animal’s cognitive abilities. By claiming that a lack of 
language may be seen as a phenomenological impossibility of speaking of a phenomenon and of 
distinguishing signifying from signifying of signifying, Derrida finally moves away from the 
mechanistic approaches to cognition and behavior of animals (Derrida 2008). 
 These instances of signifying and of language are indisputably related to the problems of 
both ontology and epistemology. In an attempt at comparison between these two approaches 
Cary Wolfe has tried to give answers to questions of what knowledge actually is, how it is 
related to abstract categories such as subjectivity and consciousness, but also what knowledge is 
and what kinds of knowledge can be obtained, both by humans and by non-human animals. 
Wolfe has searched for the answers in Derrida’s works, but also in the works of Daniel Dennett, 
a philosopher of mind (Wolfe 2010). Wolfe has presented Dennett’s approach (which he finds 
significant, but also problematic) which suggests that mental processes are like computation in 
simple computers, where the mind is the software and neural circuits the hardware of the brain. 
Dennett insisted on the usage of mechanistic terminology that would explain chemical electrical 
signaling of the brain instead of using mentalistic terms, since those notions should be used for 
more complex processes in brain that are not understood yet. Finally, his approach can be 
described as mechanistic and materialistic, since his concern is rather about the functional 
question, what the mind can do, instead of what it is made of or what its other material qualities 
are. Following this line of thought, Dennett insists that it would help solve some other issues 
related to mind-havers (Wolfe 2010). Nevertheless, this approach brings him close to the 
philosophical ideas that he is trying to dissociate himself from. Namely, it brings him close to 
Descartes’ idea of central agency, or a puppeteer that processes information that has been 
produced by neural networks and “steers the ship of subjectivity” (Wolfe 2010: 34). He does so 
(among other things) by trying to debunk the myth of double transduction, which implies the 
processes of transduction of input from the environment into neural signals and of transduction 
of those impulses into the other medium of consciousness. The main problem with Dennett’s 
approach is related to this: although he claims that his approach is that of embodied materialist 
functionalism and uses representational concepts of language, he reestablishes the disembodied 
Cartesian subject, and Wolfe argues that representationalism is precisely the thing that introduces 
dualism (Wolfe 2010). Therefore, by giving a different status to humans, which has numerous 
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ethical consequences, he also separates humans from other non-human animals by introducing, 
in Wolfe’s terms, the instance of “explosive language” (Wolfe 2010). 
 On the other hand, Wolfe introduces an argument by Maturana and Varela (but does not 
necessarily agree with them), who claim that non-human animals are also capable of rich and 
complex linguistic planes, but that it is exactly in human language where phenomena such as 
awareness, mind and self-consciousness take place. Dennett goes further to claim that the fact 
that animals do not have representational knowledge does not mean that they are not capable of 
know-how. He states that non-human animals are indeed intelligent, but unthinking, and that 
they do think, just being unaware of it. In his view, animals also may not be capable of off-
loading problems and making and using representations. Dennett finally claims (and multiply 
problematically) that animals are not only not reflective but are not reflectable upon. This is 
exactly where Wolfe introduces Derrida again to argue for the idea of steps in becoming a person 
(Wolfe 2010: 39). First of all, he explains that there are three orders of intentional systems: 
having beliefs and desires, having beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires, and finally, 
wanting the other to believe that it has beliefs and desires. Here Wolfe refers to Derrida’s 
example of a Jewish story in order to point out that animals could not be capable of the pretense 
of the second order (of having beliefs of having beliefs, which is exactly immanent in Cartesian 
materialism which Wolfe criticizes). Finally, Wolfe goes back to cite “The Animal Therefore I 
Am” and concludes that the question of animals (more precisely, animals’ capacities) is rather 
one that concerns (cap)ability and power, and the one that is again determined by passivity and 
non-ability: 
less a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse the animal such and such a power. than of asking 
whether what calls itself human has the right to rigorously attribute to man what he refuses the animal, and 
whether he can ever possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution. Thus, were 
we even to suppose—something I am not ready to concede—that the “animal” were incapable of covering 
its tracks, by what right could one concede that power to the human, to the “subject of the signifier? 
(Derrida 2008: 138) 
This construction of the animal as alien and incomprehensible, century-long, culturally deep and 
constantly reified by science, at some point turned out to be insufficient to stand in place of a 
figure of radical alterity. The animal was almost not flesh and blood enough, not overwhelming 
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enough to take the place of the ultimate Other. The 19th century saw the emergence of favorable 
conditions of the construction of the new Other, the Other to the Other. Experimental 
embryology and teratogenezis were in bloom. Darwin’s “Origin of Species” was published, 
offering repressive arguments, related to the understanding of which products of the mechanism 
that produces endless diversity should be considered as normal. The Victorian era has made the 
figure of the Other into a spectacle of the monster, constructing a whole discourse around it. The 
monster had to be constituted in speech rather than in the order of things. In order to describe 
how the new figure of the ultimate Other was constructed, how it was inseparably related to 
animals and what its attributes were, Darwin’s “Origin of Species” has to be re-read. In the 
second chapter of the book, titled “Variations Under Nature”, Darwin discusses variations and 
individual differences among species and varieties. He also explains the difference between the 
terms specie and variety, as well as monstrosity, which designates certain drastic deviations of 
(physiological) structure (Darwin 2009, 56). The language he uses reflects to a great extent how 
the whole era in which he was living and writing has constructed everything that was an 
aberration from the rule as the Other. Darwin describes monstrosity as malformation, as 
something that is alike to the normal structure of other animals, and uses an example of a pig 
with an elephant’s trunk. Further on he also explains lesser varieties and individual differences, 
which are distinguished from monstrosities, since they are possible among the members of a 
specie that live in the same delimited place. These differences and varieties are often inherited 
and accumulated. Darwin also warns readers that the discovery of a variety is not a pleasant 
moment for those who systematize, and that also not many are willing to explore inner organs 
(Darwin 2009: 57). This brings him to the description of the most complicated individual 
differences, of polymorphic genus. Darwin states that some of these variations are neither 
adverse nor useful for a specie, but rather problematic for scientists in terms of qualification. He 
emphasizes the importance of doubtful forms (Darwin 2009: 60) that are gradually connected 
with other species and more common in nature than it could be expected. The whole discussion 
peaks with the conclusion that varieties and exceptions to rules in the living world create many 
problems when determining whether they are species or varieties. He also addresses the problem 
of the existence of transitional forms that raise doubt about the boundaries of species. Finally, he 
concludes by expressing his own opinion and suggesting that both differences and varieties are 
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of high importance since they represent “the first step, that of such slight varieties as are barely 
thought worth recording in works on natural history” (Darwin 2009: 68), gradually towards a 
greater and greater differences, and finally, to a whole new species. Even though Darwin is not 
really interested in radically different entities, the monstrous also serves as a proof of the 
instability of boundaries. 
 Finally, an attempt at re-reading Darwin and Derrida through each other offers many 
interesting insights for the analysis of ultimate Otherness. For both of them, the monster is 
indisputably the gatekeeper of a borderland, of boundary itself. Even in his writings that are not 
directly related to the question of either animals or alterity, Derrida writes of monsters as of 
figures that embody (thinking) other(wise). For him, the monster is “the species of non-species, 
formless, mute, infant and terrifying form of monstrosity” (Derrida 1978: 280), a specie that is 
still about-to-become, and whose aberration is yet to be classified. The metaphor of monster that 
Derrida uses certainly comes from Darwin’s discourse. Both of them see the monster as an entity 
that breaks down totalitarian constructions of nature and taxonomic logic by questioning 
boundaries. Derridian monstrous entities, whether the text or the unnamable other, are heralds of 
a rupture, of a desperately needed transformation of world(s). Derrida would go even further to 
claim that in a way the future itself is a dangerous monster, a mutation that should challenge 
hegemony, so there is no doubt anymore that the figure of the monster may serve as a very icon 
of deconstruction, both material and semiotic, both flesh and writing. And this is exactly where 
the template used by animal, gender and even postcolonial studies is most obvious. It is also the 
direction into which many transhumanist theoreticians have set off, neglecting hundreds of pages 
already written and falling into traps already discarded by those who have already been there. 
 Following Derrida’s line of thought, a figure of the Other would always be related to the 
Garden of Eden, in a way that the Other would always be on the other, negative side of binary 
opposition, on the side that repeats the Biblical Fall. In that case, the Garden would always be the 
very heart of (phal)logocentrism. Colin Milburn belongs to a tradition of those who went further 
to claim that both for Darwin and Derrida the origin can always only be a trace, graduation, 
event, but not an origin (Milburn 2003: 611). And as an entity that repeats fall, the posthuman 
will always be the one that brings the apocalypse in the eyes of narrow, too humanist 
transhumanism.  
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 The question of the monster (and in this case, posthuman other is also necessarily 
monstrous)  as the figure of the other is, once again, inseparable from an instance of boundaries. 
Nevertheless, in the tradition that assumes the human to have clearly demarcated boundaries, in 
the tradition in which man is at the core of things, the monstrous other is displaced. It is without 
a structure and at the same time both within and outside the Nature. It is a dangerous supplement 
to nature and has an immense number of (rhizomatic) connections. It is infinitely dependent on 
the existence of its own other. This instance of a dangerous supplement also indicates that 
monsters are always necessarily violent, even as a metaphor. Monsters are threatening to violate 
the order of things and the very core of humanism. As Milburn suggests, they also have a terrible 
life of their own. 
 Therefore, it is no wonder that the figure of the ultimate other is always turned into a 
spectacle. Besides being the other of nature, both monsters and posthumans, located at the 
breaking points of the culturally imaginable, are also the other of culture. The heritage of the 
religious rhetoric of the Fall and sin has helped in the construction of radical alterity, or (again) 
the other to the other as a spectacle, especially during the Victorian era. The monster’s non-
speaking and general muteness are perceived not as non-language, but rather as a question, a 
doubt, an invitation. The Victorian era was in a way a fertile ground for this construction of 
bizarre otherness, and, what is more, it confirmed the idea of Sartre, who wrote that Europeans 
could become human only by creating slaves (and monsters) (Sartre 1961). Both the natural 
sciences (first of all, medicine) and humanities lacked a consistent definition of the concept of a 
monster at that time. This fact was reflected in social consciousness and literary representations 
of the century, and a new discourse of monstrosity was soon created. There are numerous 
examples of which that of Joseph Merrick, the Elephant Man, is probably most famous. This 
example also reflects the inconsistency of the definition and the methodology within the field of 
teratology. Medical workers at that time were not able to offer any clear diagnoses or treatments 
to Merrick and to many other “monsters” of that time. So this case, like many others, was more a 
matter of medical, philosophical and anthropological debates of that time, and in this way was 
gradually turned into a spectacle. Merrick could not possibly be admitted to a public hospital due 
to his incurable and, more than that, non-classifiable condition. At the same time circuses and 
“freak-shows” became increasingly popular all across the Europe, and especially in United 
44 
 
 
Kingdom. They were held in the Egyptian Hall, and the isolation of monsters between these 
shows has kept them rare, exotic and worth paying to see. The same goes for any possible step 
toward achievement of the posthuman – numerous conferences, symposia and fairs are held 
around the world each year, and the only way to describe fascination by technological 
improvements is spectacular.   
 In the case of Victorian freak shows, many medical doctors were present, not for the sake 
of examination or science, but rather pure entertainment. All this resulted in (most often human) 
beings with certain deformities being bottled, cataloged, roughly described by using conflicting 
vocabulary of diagnosis, and finally, created as a spectacle. There are numerous examples of the 
figure of the monster in the literature and popular culture of that time, and the audience received 
what it wanted most: flesh and blood, a spectacle, the difference according to which it could 
confirm its own normality. 
 Numerous other parallels are present besides the similarity in a manner in which animal 
and monster have been gradually distinguished as a radical alterity to those of anticipation of the 
posthuman. Haraway's cyborg as an entity of post-gender world (gender studies), Spivak's 
subaltern (post-colonial studies), queer studies' rethinking of marginal identities all have very 
similar, if not the same underlying matrices. In order to prevent transhumanism from being not 
just too humanist, but also repetitive and redundant, it is necessary to reflect on how they have 
related to the problem in question, that of otherness.  
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3. OTHERNESS 
The emergence of posthuman subjectivity has been present in numerous cultural texts throughout 
a long period of time. Such texts have become increasingly popular during the last decades of the 
20th century, when the role of technology in everyday life became undeniably important. Starting 
with Mary Shelley's “Frankenstein” at the end of the 19th century (1832), Fritz Lang's 
“Metropolis” (1927), science fiction and finally cyberpunk of the '80s and '90s of the 20th century 
as well as emerging post-cyberpunk, futuristic scenarios were everything but optimistic. “High 
tech, low life”, a sentence that is used to describe cyberpunk, bears a worrisome tone. And this 
worry has an implicit humanism par excellence – fear for human survival, integrity, and above 
all human supremacy and exceptionalism. Transhumanists such as Ray Kurzweil and Hans 
Moravec both excitedly predict a coming singularity, the uploading of human consciousness and 
disembodiment, and are putting a huge effort into a personal preparation for the posthuman 
future. Still, academic texts and debates on transhumanism do not really indicate any movement 
from humanism toward something that would be overcoming of its problematic aspects. 
Humanism resurfaces in transhumanism even more, in a form of an obsessive worry and fear for 
human well-being and integrity. Unfortunately, this means that transhumanism is, just like 
Cartesian humanism, incapable of contemplating differences and of thinking differently. It is 
thus unable to think otherness, the posthuman subjectivity for whose arrival it has been preparing 
for so long. Even the cases of inclusion of otherness within transhumanist ideas by positive 
valuation or adoration present in technotopias are not a transcendence of humanist limitations 
and binarities, but only a repetition of them. Thus, a certain effort is needed for transhumanism 
to cast off the burden of humanism and its limitations, in order to be better prepared for the 
future. For transhumanism is still too humanist for what its main tasks are – welcoming and 
coexisting with its posthuman other. It has to embrace the liberal humanities' 18 efforts and 
movement toward posthumanism. The discipline has to carefully re-read the narratives of human 
                                                 
 
18 Even though Wolfe considers that many disciplines among the liberal humanities have failed in accepting 
otherness, the effort is still present in a sense that each discipline had its own re-reading that was considered as 
leaning towards posthumanities. Among these examples is Donna Haraway's contribution to feminism. On the other 
hand, the disciplines are failing in the sense that instead of accepting otherness, it is being tamed. The liberal 
humanities accept otherness as long as they can write and talk about the other, while still remaining ignorant towards 
what otherness has to say about them.   
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exceptionalism and to become posthumanist – in a sense not only to repeat templates that other 
posthumanist disciplines have established and reused, but to be aware of mistakes that have been 
made. It has to reflect on, for example, gender studies, the discipline that probably has the 
greatest number of pages written about otherness, and to skip three waves of revisions, as well as 
to reflect on similar disciplines that have as its focus the problem of reading the other as a threat, 
and that have been reestablishing its methodologies and postulates until the present day.  
 Transhumanism has to avoid fixed categories, to remain a subversive and constant 
deconstruction. As an expression of deconstructive practices, it has to constantly keep moving 
away from the center, to keep becoming dislocated, to avoid normativity. Transhumanism has to 
become a discipline that refuses to be disciplined, whose foundations elude that which could 
make it fixed and stable. In a sense, transhumanism also has to reflect on Judith Butler's 
argument for Teresa de Lauretis19 in their debate about queer studies: both queer studies and 
transhumanism have to avoid the damnation of being institutionalized and introduced into the 
academic discourse of humanities, since that would make them stable and obedient; both have to 
maintain the main object of their studies, identity, subversive, without structure, open.  
 Academic texts that aspire to emphasize potential pitfalls and mistakes that certain (future 
oriented) disciplines can make, also have to avoid offering answers, remedies, for in order to be 
able to think (about) the future, the discipline has to avoid the anticipation of its outputs. The 
future has to stay unknown, the other. The exposure to what is about to come requires both the 
entity and the discipline to give up on certainty and predictions of how to embrace the unknown.  
 As for the object of studies, apart of becoming, in a sense, a superhuman by embracing 
cognitive and physical enhancements, in order to survive the arrival and coexistence with 
posthuman other, transhuman subjectivity has to become less humanist. This calls for yet another 
focusing on the problem of otherness, in this case – on the ultimate other of the transhuman self. 
What is different about this radical alterity is that it has been thought of and imagined as the 
monstrous other since the very beginning. In the cases of gender, post-colonial, studies about 
nationalism and similar fields, monstrosity was usually only a figure of speech, a metaphor used 
                                                 
 
19 The ongoing academic debate between Judith Butler and Teresa de Lauretis is related to the questions such 
as whether queer identity exists, if its existence contradicts the deconstructive (in a sense de-centering) logics of the 
discipline, as well as whether institutionalization of the academic discipline has made it less activist.  
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in order to describe the strange and bizarrely incomprehensible other human being; while 
posthuman otherness is considered to be the first form of radical alterity that threatens by 
possibly being superior. This is, put simply, exactly why the future posthuman other is important 
for liberal humanities, which can accept the other others as long as they are inferior and 
unthreatening. The potentially superior future posthuman other is seen as a rupture, since unlike 
various other cultural categories of otherness (women, racial and ethnic minorities, animals), the 
posthuman other is ignorant of whether the liberal humanities can or cannot extend their 
normalization and taming (hidden under an euphemism of egalitarianism) to its existence.  
 Thus, further analysis must avoid offering unambiguous answers, fixed categorizations 
and stable models. Derridian thought on the future, otherness, hospitality and boundaries 
together with Jean-Luc Nancy’s rethinking of the notions of community seem the most 
appropriate tools for such analysis. Not only are these notions suitable for the purposes of the 
present analysis, but the theory behind them seems to do less harm to transhumanism than any 
other, in terms of avoiding normativity and regimentation.  
 
3. 1. À-venir 
The posthuman other belongs to the posthuman future – about which we do not have any 
knowledge, any experience, about which we cannot make any certain predictions. In order to 
better understand how the future community of human and the non-human will be, what the 
thinking will be, the reflection upon Derrida's concept of à venir has to be made.  
 As the French language has two different expressions for the future, le futur and l'avenir, 
and as they are used to refer to different instances, it is necessary to first delimit them, so the 
latter can be understood more precisely. The first expression, le futur, is used in sentences to 
designate a possibility, a prediction, something that belongs to a distant future. It refers to 
hypothetical situations, desires and prophecies. On the other hand,  l'avenir is used to describe 
events of the future that are not as remote. L'avenir refers to that which is yet-to-come, and 
Derrida thus uses the expression as a condition of “(...) all promises or of all hope, of all 
awaiting, of all performativity, of all opening towards the future” (Derrida 1996: 68). Belonging 
to a post-structuralist tradition of theoreticians that consider the future to always consist of the 
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unexpected, Derrida uses the notion of à-venir in order to describe that which is yet to come as 
something that provokes understanding, that initiates a change in direction, unexpected junctures 
and growth, a disjointedness. If read through a Derridian lens, the posthuman entity that is yet to 
come is certainly expected to be that which provokes thoughts and whose emergence necessarily 
implies a change in focus and ruptures. It is that which requires the rethinking of every order and 
of finitude, that which denies the possibility of being measured and durable. Derrida inscribes in 
a sense a certain new meaning in the notion of à-venir. He reads it as that which unhinges and 
disjoints an event and by doing so disturbs the possibility of that very event. Even though he 
writes about the impossibility of the à-venir to be pinned down as a metaphysical entity, the 
author anyway considers it to be that which allows thinking of what is beyond the closure of 
metaphysics (Derrida 1996: 72). In this sense, à-venir echoes the entities and events that are 
arriving, that are afoot, unknown and unthinkable by the present. As a rupture that indicates 
movement in an unexpected direction, à-venir is a trace20 of an erasure of traces, and as such it 
indicates not the future, but a direction of other texts (Derrida 1996: 91). The disjointed, 
ruptured, structureless posthuman other that is yet to come thus escapes mastery and 
determinable ground. And it not only escapes mastery, but the possibility of being thought at all 
by the mind of the transhuman. As a radically different entity that is yet to come, the posthuman 
other interrupts the present, identity, any kind of structure, breaks all of the rules, being reached 
within categories of space and time, as well as every attempt at purification. It belongs to the 
future, although it does not originate from it just as it does not originate from the past, but rather 
originates from itself. In the same manner, it is unable to constitute itself within the identifiable 
present. That which is yet to come is always necessarily radically different other, since it is that 
which dislocates existing binary oppositions21. Derrida writes that what is to come (the ultimate 
other that is to come) always bears a heritage and a possibility of repetition (Derrida 2002: 83). 
This repetition implies the possibility of multiplication, and what is to come is always plural and 
                                                 
 
20 The concept of trace is of great importance for Derrida's work. Although Derrida denies the possibility of 
defining the notion, it generally refers to a minimal repeatability in every experience. The author establishes the 
notion in his books “Of Grammatology” (1967) and “Writing and Difference” (1967).  
21 For Derrida, most important binarities that are being dislocated by that which is to come are those between 
self and the other, presence and absence and of course, past and future.  
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irreducible to quantification – it is impossible to reduce it to a single, distinguishable entity with 
clearly demarcated boundaries, a figure, not even to one of the figures otherwise used by Derrida 
for a description of gatekeepers – a specter, a ghost, a demon.  
 Our potential posthuman future, thus, is a future of a multitude of possibilities, of a 
multiplicity of scenarios with an irreducible plurality of radical other(s). It is not a linear future, 
but one that unfolds in an infinite number of directions.   
 The unknown, multiple other that is yet to come is due to these characteristics read as a 
threat by transhumanists. Derrida, on the other hand, suggests a messianic reading of this coming 
alterity, since messianicity implies a certain kind of undecidability – between whether it is 
coming or not; and also between whether it (in this case the transhuman) is prepared for the 
encounter with something so foreign, so unexpected. Messianicity in this case is messianicity 
without religion, and it also implies the possibility of the coming that comes without the arrival 
and being present, a kind of arrival for which Derrida suggests to empty all meaning (Derrida 
1994: 96). As such, the arrival implies emergence from a radical impossibility, for à-venir 
remains (trapped) in a state of emergence.  
But it is also another kind of impossibility, one that would follow Derrida's logic of the relation 
between the possible and the impossible, which permeates many of his writings: the 
impossibility that is actually the only possibility, the only certainty, since unlike the possible 
(which may or may not happen) it will finally be actualized as an impossibility. Impossibility 
also refers to the acquisition of knowledge of what is to come, and Derrida suggests that à-venir 
goes beyond knowledge, since it has nothing to do with both knowing and ignorance (Derrida 
1989: 30). It is also an impossibility of identity, of coherence and of closure.  
 Sticking to humanist postulates in a situation of the arrival of the ultimate other, the one 
that breaks every relation with order, would be fatal for transhuman subjectivity. The apocalyptic 
tone of transhumanist theoreticians who write about the encounter with the posthuman only 
makes sense when that which is yet to come is perceived as challenging the other, since the old 
categories and modes of encountering the other would not make any sense in this situation. The 
problematic humanist values implicite in transhumanism would keep transhumanism 
exclusionary and purifying, and the identity of the other would remain that which is seen as a 
contaminant that has to be purged, not a quality to be absorbed – and would thus fit into the 
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aforementioned Marchesini´s obsolete divergence-expulsion model of identities (Marchesini 
2010: 92).  
 
3. 2. Hospitality  
The emergence of l’arrivant, in this case the posthuman other, demands radical reconstruction of 
the manner in which the encounter with it is thought. L’arrivant may arrive even if it is not 
expected, when it is least expected, without an invitation. The question of arrivant is necessarily 
related to that to which it approaches - the threshold, the border, the boundary, limit. The arrival 
to the threshold requires unconditional acceptance, a coexistence that would transcend hierarchy. 
The one who arrives has no name nor identity yet, and is therefore thought of in terms of 
absolute otherness. Derrida describes the arrivant as a monstrosity:  
[t]he future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, that is, that which can only be surprising, that 
for which we are not prepared, is heralded by species of monsters. A future that would not be monstrous 
would not be a future; it would already be a predictable, calculable, and programmable tomorrow. All 
experience open to the future is prepared or prepares itself to welcome the monstrous arrivant. (Weber, 
Derrida, 1995: 386-387) 
And this is exactly where transhumanist readings should be careful: l’arrivant is not a person, a 
subject, nor a living thing, nor it is “an intruder, an invader, or a colonizer” (Derrida 1996: 34), 
but rather a “hospitality itself” (Derrida 1996: 33). 
 In order to argue his thesis about the necessity of the unconditional hospitality of radical 
alterity, Derrida re-reads Kant's famous “Perpetual Peace”. Kant describes hospitality as a right 
rather than an act of philanthropy and has an anthropological dimension in mind. Hospitality is 
for Kant the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility but as a member of the household. 
Derrida goes further to expand the question to whether one owes hospitality toward the non-
human other, whether it be an animal, vegetable or divine; not only to a stranger (Derrida 2000: 
4). The author describes a welcomed guest as a stranger that is commonly treated as a friend22. 
                                                 
 
22 Derrida uses notion of friend in a same sense as Carl Schmitt did. Schmitt's opposition between friend and 
enemy is of crucial importance for political philosophy, and Derrida initially uses this concept in his texts about 
democracy. In Derrida's writings, the opposition between friend and enemy is narrowly related to the one between 
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On the other hand, the one who welcomes is seen as master or patron of a topos (household, 
state, nation, subjectivity) where one is welcomed to. As such, one who offers hospitality defines 
the conditions of hospitality. Derrida thus suggests the concept of hospitality to imply a violent 
contradiction – as long as there is an obligation, a necessity, a duty; as long as there is an 
authority of the master of the household who sets rules, unconditional hospitality is impossible 
(Derrida 2000: 4). The law of hospitality turns out to be the laws of the household, of oikos – of 
the economy of giving and receiving, of reciprocity, of boundaries that should not be crossed. 
This kind of hospitality would imply maintenance of humanist views on this problem. For 
example, if the problem of identity is in question, sticking to the position of the master, setting 
thresholds and boundaries, counting on reciprocity, would only make sense in a case of 
traditional, rigid, stable identities. In order to be able to accept the radical other that is arriving 
(and it must be accepted), one must unconditionally open boundaries of their own identity, 
prepare to give everything and possibly receive nothing in return. Nevertheless, the author writes 
that the threshold is always present, and where the threshold is; there is no hospitality, but “the 
difference and the gap between the hospitality of invitation and the hospitality of visitation” 
(Derrida 2000: 14).  
 Derrida writes that hospitality thus turns out to be a self-contradictory concept, in the 
sense that it implies a possibility of producing itself as self-destructive, as impossible, that it “can 
only be possible on a condition of its impossibility” (Derrida 2000: 5). Hospitality offered to the 
ultimate other has to refrain from “reaffirming: this is mine, I am at home, you are welcome in 
my home” (Derrida 2000: 14).  
 Yet another paradox related to hospitality derives from Derrida's statement that it is 
exactly the absolute other, the arrivant, that makes all forms of belonging (including the 
humanity itself) possible (Derrida 1996: 35). Among the forms of belonging the author mentions 
cultural, social, sexual, national, but also concepts such as ego, personhood, subjectivity and 
consciousness (Derrida 1996: 35). The one who offers hospitality waits for l’arrivant without 
knowing whom (s)he awaits, without knowing whether it is a Messiah or a monster or anyone 
else who may come. Thus, hospitality can only happen beyond the possibility of hospitality, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
hospitality and hostility.  
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“overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is” (Derrida 2000 14).  
 Hospitality is therefore, just like the arrivant, always in the process of the emergence, 
always à-venir. Transhumanist anticipation of its radical other needs to be thought within 
different categories than those of friendship and hostility. Unlike other liberal humanities (as 
Wolfe refers to several disciplines), for transhumanism the figure of radical alterity is still not 
present, it still has no shape, name or identity. Thus for the first time it is possible to think its 
arrival anew and to prepare manners for relating to it.  
 
3. 3. I think, therefore I think the Other 
 Derrida's call for thinking in paradoxes, for simultaneous thinking of contradictory 
claims, or put simply – his challenge to the commonsensical rational thought which is logical, 
totalitarian, exclusive – opens the way for the thinking of the absolute other which is so foreign 
and even impossible to the process of thinking. Thinking of an entity that does not fall under any 
of the common categories of belonging (as are aforementioned), of something which may never 
fully emerge; simply – thinking of the unthinkable – creates possibilities for the impossible, for 
uncertainty, indecisiveness, instability – for some kind of non-knowledge. And the presence of 
the other is necessarily uncertain and unstable, since it implies the risk of destroying the core of 
the “I”, of the instance that comprehends the law of thinking. This kind of approach to the 
problem of being with the other, of a paradoxical relation that implies both transcendence and 
belonging and distance and intimacy (Blagojević 2007: 40), goes well in line with other 
examples of Derrida's non-canonical understanding of politics and the political. Not only that the 
author re-reads Schmitt's opposition between friend and enemy in his “Politics of Friendship” 
(Derrida 2001), but also his understanding of hospitality for the impossible, in a sense opens the 
possibility for a different understanding of politics and the political, which is crucial for 
understanding the notion of otherness. His understanding is different in as much that he assumes 
a hospitality of the stranger who makes possible the question of the political: “The question with 
which the foreigner will address them, to open this great debate, which will also be a great fight, 
is nothing less than that of the political, of man as a political being. The question of the political 
is given there as being the question that comes to us from the other, the foreigner” (Derrida 2000: 
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66). Derrida goes further to claim that the foreigner, the absolute other that breaks every relation 
with law and duty and requires absolute hospitality, has “no shape. No sex No name. It is neither 
a man nor a woman. It is not selfhood, not “I”, not a subject, nor a particular person. It is another 
Dasein23 that every Dasein has, through the voice, a voice it hears, of itself, not within itself, in 
the ear, in the “inner ear”, within a certain subjective interior, not from a distance and away from 
the ear (since it cannot be heard from far in a specific external space, i.e. in a certain 
transcendence) but in one's own environment, at a distance which is neither absolute – absolutely 
infinite – nor worthless in the absolute closeness of one's ownership, therefore impossible of 
being determined according to particular units of measurement in the world. This range of voice 
to-be-in-the-range-of-voice. makes the other someone of a different kind” (Derrida 2001: 465).  
 Finally, Derrida questions the meaning of Descartes' cogito for the modern subjectivity, 
which is crucial for further understanding of why and how transhuman subjectivity has to be-
with instead of simply be. If the Cartesian maxim “I think, therefore I am”, which is at the core 
of modern thought, is altered in order to fit to the new conception of subjectivity, it would have 
to take the instance of otherness into an account. As such, Derrida suggests that the maxim 
should rather be: “I think, therefore I think the other: I need the other in order to think” (Derrida 
2001: 340). This necessity of the inclusion of otherness into the process of thinking makes the 
very process unimaginable without this instance. Not only that for subjectivity thinking demands 
the other, but the notion of otherness is placed at the very core of the process of thinking itself. 
The modified maxim suggests the ontological, the ethical and the economic24 dislocation as it 
demands absolute hospitality and the unconditional opening of all boundaries and offering the 
core of the self to intrusions. 
 
                                                 
 
23 Even though Heideggerian understanding of Dasein and Mitsein is of crucial importance for both Derrida's 
and Nancy's writing (and especially their understanding of a community), for purposes of this thesis it is not 
necessary to exhaustively reflect on his theory. 
24 Economic as that which has to do with oikos, the household, in this context: the economy of giving and 
receiving. 
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3. 4. Being-with 
3. 4. 1. Community  
If Derrida's alteration, “I think, therefore I think the other” is re-read through Jean-Luc Nancy's 
writings, it would indicate that no entity (or rather: no singularity) exists without being plural. 
This plurality implies coexistence with the other, a community of a different kind than those of 
the past. As Nancy carefully reads Derrida, it could be said that his understanding of a 
community both embraces the radical otherness and implies absolute hospitality.  
 The author challenges traditional understandings of the notion of community as a totality 
in which all voices and expressions are like-minded, a community that rests on exclusiveness and 
is self-enclosed (Nancy: 1991). Traditional understanding of community also implies a 
collectivity that provides continuity and rests upon an exclusionary myth of a sense of unity of a 
certain kind. Although a critique of the traditional conception of community is also present in 
works by other authors25, Nancy's reading of the notion is especially important for the purposes 
of the current analysis since he calls for the incorporation of more inclusive and flexible 
modalities of being-in-common (Nancy 1991: 60). A community is now understood as a cultural, 
political and socio-historical construct that has to be replaced with new forms of belongings, 
since the context in which they are emerging is radically changed.  
 It is also necessary to point out Nancy's and Derrida's different approaches to the new 
conception of a community, since the two conceptions are in a dialogue. Derrida establishes his 
conception in his “Politics of Friendship” (written in 1994), where he writes about fraternity not 
only as a sort of primary community, but more than that, as of the instance that determines what 
is included into and excluded from the community. Derrida calls for a friendship that is as close 
as a fraternity, and goes further to equate the process of fraternisation to the process of 
identification (Derrida 2001: 108). The equation follows the identification of a brother (or further 
on, a friend) with the self. This sort of community excludes those entities that cannot be 
                                                 
 
25  The opus of a critique of traditional understanding of a community includes works by Giorgio Agamben 
(“The Coming Community”, 1993), Maurice Blanchot (“The Unavowable Community”, 1983), Jacques Derrida 
(“Politics of Friendship”, 1994, but also numerous smaller works), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (“Empire”, 
2000, “Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire”, 2004), Roberto Esposito (“Communitas: the Origin 
and Destiny of Community”, 2004). 
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identified with the self, those different, foreign and uncommon entities. Since this kind of 
conception is exclusionary, it is also necessarily violent, but nevertheless, as still being also an 
inclusive conception, implies a community that can be described as being-with (Nancy 2000: 
38). Nancy's approach, on the other hand, is based on the interruption of a myth (Lacoue-
Labarthe, Nancy: 1991) – on an inability to describe a common origin – the inability to recognize 
the other as a brother. Morin explains the interruption as that which does not initiate the 
disappearance of myths, but “they (myths) no longer function as the ground of communal 
belonging: it becomes impossible for us to gather around the narration of our common origin. 
The interruption does not build a community, it un-works it, that is, it lets a space open in the 
identification of the community with itself. This un-working is the active incompleteness of 
community: it prevents the community from effecting itself as work” (Morin 2004).  
 Nancy's conception of community does not imply any sort of common substance or 
value, and that is what makes it a desirable model of a community of the transhuman and 
posthuman. The author goes further to claim that community, being in common, being-with is a 
model that replaces being; that identity always necessarily includes otherness – that being 
singular plural is the sense of (necessarily co) existence. For Nancy, being as being-with has to 
imply all those threats that l’arrivant may bring – of which, for the author, most important 
aspects of being are being exposed, being abandoned and being interrupted (Nancy 2000: 51). 
This is where a notion of sense appears to be of great importance, since for Nancy being in 
common is a sense, not vice versa (sense is not common to being). It means that this sense 
should not be considered as a pre-existing common substance of our existence; sense appears in 
a community in which it is shared as a “multiplicity of singular expressions” (Nancy 2000: 64). 
 Community has nothing to do with owning a common substance; now interruptions, 
noise, misunderstandings and differences are desirable as constituents of a community, in order 
for it not to be exclusionary and thus violent. Nancy goes further to finally claim that also a 
complete coexistence, complete being-together (and thus also absolute hospitality) is nothing 
more than a “suicidal endpoint of an immanent search for an original community” (Nancy 2000: 
70).  
 One of the crucial aspects of a community is the experience of being exposed. Being 
exposed to each other by referring to another, by believing (and the instance of belief is of 
56 
 
 
inevitable importance for both Nancy and Derrida) that the other will receive what is 
communicated. And only in communication meaning arises; exposure is thus necessary for the 
meaning to exist. 
 For Nancy, being exposed is even an equivalent for the existence itself, since it is 
“beginning from its simple identity in itself and from its pure position, exposed in appearing, in 
creation, and, as such, exposed to the outside, exteriority, multiplicity, alterity, and change” 
(Nancy 2000: 187). Nancy writes that neither the least signification nor the most elaborate 
concepts have immanent meaning, unless they are communicated within a community or within 
oneself (Nancy 2000: 2). Meaning is therefore only meaning(ful) if it is shared, and the author 
goes even further to claim that meaning is the sharing of Being – whereas being does not have a 
meaning, but “is meaning that is, in turn, its own circulation – and we are the circulation” (Nancy 
2000: 2). And this is the exact place from which Nancy derives his notion of being-with, since 
being itself can only be a kind of circulation, and therefore being-with-another. The only 
meaning for the author is thus the meaning of circulation within the community, and it is 
important to note that this circulation is not necessarily linear – but implies plurality (or rather 
multitude) of directions. This circulation is also always between that who is exposed and that 
who is communicating, always between places, moments and “without any progression or linear 
path” (Nancy 2000: 4). Nancy finds this interval, distance, “betweenness” that does not even 
lead from one to the other (but is still in a relation with both) of great importance, and claims it is 
rather contiguity than continuity: “There is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme 
closeness emphasizes the distancing it opens up” (Nancy 2000: 5).  
 Hospitality (also that hospitality to a community) offered by the transhuman self to the 
posthuman arrivant would indeed imply not only this kind proximity that would fit to “the law of 
touching that is separation” (Nancy 2000: 5), but a general and quintessential opening of 
boundaries; a contact that is beyond connection and disconnection, a contact in which all of 
transhuman being is in touch with all of posthuman being. Nancy writes that in case of this, 
touching, or rather, coming into contact, implies making sense (of one another): “then this 
coming penetrates nothing; there is no intermediate or mediating milieu” (Nancy 2000: 5).  
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3. 4. 2. Being singular plural  
The singular is a plural. It also undoubtedly offers the property of indivisibility, but it is not indivisible the 
way substance is indivisible. It is, instead, indivisible in each instant (au coup par coup), within the event 
of its singularization. It is indivisible like any instant is indivisible, or punctually indivisible. (Nancy 2000: 
32) 
The desirable mode of being described by Nancy – being-with – is the mode that is inevitable for 
future communities. Transhuman and posthuman selves cannot exist in isolation in as much as 
mutual exclusion or ignorance would harm the existence of both. The self necessarily has to open 
its boundaries and become a multitude. Nancy suggests that being has to become singularily 
plural (or plurally singular), since the self exists only through coexistence, through sharing of the 
world (Nancy 2000: 29). “Being” of “being singular plural” is supposed to be read both as a verb 
and a noun, and its essence singular plural. It means that any sort of self-enclosed, substantial 
essence of being is unacceptable in emerging communities. Essence is thus, Nancy suggests, 
coessence that cannot be reduced to a multiplicity of essences, but “signifies the essential sharing 
of essentiality, sharing in the guise of assembling” (Nancy 2000: 30). The coessentiality is that 
which is at the very heart of being-with, where with is that instance that constitutes being itself. 
The singularity can not be dissociated form the plurality, since singularity of each instance is 
necessarily bound to the other, is being-with-many. 
 An even bigger risk than that which is immanent in the arrival of the posthuman other is 
the one that is implied in the understanding of being as being-with. Being-with leaves the self 
broken, interrupted, open and thus uncertain, indecisive and unstable – Nancy alters (now 
dysfunctional) ego sum into simple ego cum (Nancy 2000: 31).  
 Being-with is an indisputably political notion par excellence, driven by antagonisms and 
at the core of every political question. Nancy follows the Derridian tradition of political 
philosophy and thinks of the notion of community in these terms, and claims that the whole 
history of philosophy is in a sense “the thinking of being-with, and because of this, it is also 
thinking with as such” (Nancy 2000: 31). 
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3. 4. 3. Being singular plural as a political Being 
Issues related to the notion of otherness that are relevant to Nancy's writing, such as exposure, 
community, fraternity, friendship, love – any sort of giving and receiving – turn out to be 
political notions par excellence. Thinking of the political, as well as political thinking, requires 
further understanding of why the notion of singular being, of identity that is self-identical, has to 
be necessarily thought of in relation to the other. Traditional understandings of subjectivity as 
singular and self-identical are thus opposed to the understanding of subjectivity as being-with, 
and paradoxical formulations of traditional self-identical subjectivity has to be described.  
 Subjectivity thought as self-identical, as identity, owns or possesses itself (as its own 
property). Self-identity, understood as a consequence of a strategy of ownership, is structured as 
a process of appropriation (Blagojević 2007: 19) which indisputably requires the other. The other 
is not perceived in its otherness and difference, but as the other that has been acknowledged, 
cognized and translated into language (of the self, to its own language), whose self has been 
reduced to the known and familiar. However, the other can neither be translated nor owned, it 
remains incomprehensible and therefore even identity cannot be identical to itself nor can it 
possess itself. This would imply that modern subjectivity thought of as identity is always already 
in danger since it always escapes itself and is incapable of possessing and encompassing itself. 
Unlike traditional totalizing and absolute understandings of subjectivity that deny otherness as an 
integral part of the self and overcome differences in a process of subjectivization, singular plural 
subjectivity implies the possibility of a survival in differences, of the existence of the other in its 
otherness. This otherness is thus constitutive for the process of thinking itself, since thinking 
demands otherness. Finally, thinking implies a possibility to think the political, to the thinking of 
the other and the other thinking.  
 And this is of crucial importance for understanding of the coexistence of transhuman and 
posthuman selves: before thinking of the political in the context of the coexistence of the two, 
before thinking of the constitution of a community between the two, it has to be emphasized that 
communication indisputably happens with the otherness of the other; since the other only exists 
in its otherness. This also refers to a call that Inger makes in “Äkta människor”: to accept and 
embrace the other that is threatening to take over (until recently) characteristically human roles: 
works, membership in communities of various kinds, and many other roles.  
59 
 
 
 
3. 4. 4. The being-with of being 
Nancy suggests the need for the radical emphasizing of the “with” as a crucial aspect of Being 
and as “its proper plural singular coessence” (Nancy 2000: 34). This need is a consequence of a 
shift in thinking that starts from the one or the other, as well as that thinking that begins from the 
togetherness of the two, to a thinking that is rather “thinking, absolutely and without reserve, 
beginning from the “with”, as the proper essence of one whose Being is nothing other than with-
one-another (l'un-avec-l'autre)” (Nancy 2000: 34). 
 “With” is the essential feature of Being that indicates sharing of spatio-temporal 
continuity and makes Being singular plural a necessity26 – the meaning of Being understood as 
being-with excludes the possibility of essentialist core, of self-sufficiency and self-enclosed 
entities.  
 The author describes “with” as that which “neither goes from the same to the other, nor 
from the other to the other. In a certain sense, the “with” does not “go” anywhere; it does not 
constitute a process. But it is the closeness, the brushing up against or coming across, the almost-
there (l'à-peu-près) or distanced proximity” (Nancy 2000: 98). Being-with is an imperative, just 
as a community is:  
[...] the concept of community appears to have its own prefix as its only content: the cum, the with deprived 
of substance and connection, stripped of inferiority, subjectivity, and personality. Either way, sovereignty is 
nothing. Sovereignty is nothing but the com-; as such, it is always and indefinitely “to be completed”, as in 
com-munism or com-passion. (Nancy 2000: 36) 
The coming into being of being-with Nancy designates as coappearance – a sort of (co)existence 
or appearance that cannot be detached from cum which is its fundamental ontological structure 
(Nancy 2000: 61).  
 The being of the transhuman self has to be being-with all the other selves, whether 
human, posthuman or non-human. It has to “give itself occurs, dis-poses itself (made event, 
history and world) as its own singular plural with” (Nancy 2000: 38) – put simply, it has to be 
                                                 
 
26 Being-with thus has to imply presence-with – it has to imply being-present as well as the present of Being. 
Nancy suggests that the two should not coincide in or with itself (Nancy 2000: 41). 
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exposed. The being-with of the transhuman self has to become simultaneous with itself and with 
others, its being has to be an initial plural unity, an indivisible multitude; it has to be-many.  
 Nancy writes that both communism and socialism have been expected as revolutionary 
arrivals that will bring rupture, innovation and a fundamental reconstruction of the world (Nancy 
2000: 41). Transhumanists to the same degree expect the arrival of the posthuman other to bring 
a new world  and in a sense, a condition for all three is simply coexistence. Coexistence implies 
various modalities of being, starting with being-with, being-in-common, being-with-one-another 
and has “weak and unpleasant connotations” (Nancy 2000: 43) but is still the only possible 
manner of existence, even though the figure and identification of each of them is difficult to 
imagine (Nancy 2000: 47). Probably the closest figuration would be Derridian monster or a 
specter – and both (or all) of these possible figurations appear as spectacular for the 
contemporary theory (and culture). Being-together can thus also be read as being-together-at-the-
spectacle, since “being-together understands itself as an inversion of the representation of itself, 
which it believes to be capable of giving itself as originary (and lost): the Greek city assembled 
in community at the theater of its own myths” (Nancy 2000: 51). The conception of being-
together as being-together-at-the-spectacle is in a dialogue with a common conception of a 
spectacle, since it implies reading of a spectacle as a method of othering, where the subject gazes 
from a distance, and the object(s) are seen as exotic and external, thus not part of self. 
Coexistence, according to Nancy, implies such practices as are encounters, porousness, osmosis, 
rubbing up against, as well as attraction and repulsion (Nancy 2000: 186). As such, coexistence 
is existence itself, since it is not just that which happens to the existence, nor is it simply its 
addition.  
 The author suggests the conditions of the critique of the singular plurality of Being by 
claiming that it (a critique) has to be founded on other principles than those of the ontology of 
sameness and otherness27; it has to be based on a sort of coontology and “to support both 
“human” and the “non-human”; it must be an ontology for the world, for everyone” (Nancy 
2000: 53).   
                                                 
 
27 Since, as Foucault suggested in “The Order of Things”, modern episteme is exactly based on the interplay 
between identity and difference.  
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3. 4. 5. Being singular plural: an ongoing process  
There is a certain necessity, even urgency, in Nancy's writing, for being singular plural to be read 
as an entity that is ongoing, unfinished: mêlée. The processuality does echo a certain association 
to a post-structuralist opposition of the process to a structure, and it is of great importance to 
reflect upon this binarity in the context of the proposed mode of being (-with).  
 Singular plural being has to be read as a process, rather than a structure, for a structure 
would imply it to be a complete, stable entity. In the case of a structure, the plurality would have 
to become a fixed web of relations, identity. As such, Being would struggle to remain being-
with, and would rather be a rigid, closed entity. Thus, if rigid and self-enclosed, transhuman 
subjectivity would be unable to break free from the humanist burden – from own supremacy and 
exceptionalism in relation to other forms of life.  
 This urge for approaching to an entity as to a process, action, something unfinished, 
incomplete and unstable, has its concretization in a chapter “Eulogy for the Mêlée” of Nancy's 
book “Being Singular Plural” (Nancy 2000: 145). Even though the author writes about a place, 
Sarajevo28, that has become an expression of a system for the reduction to identity, the chapter 
may be read as if it was about an entity other than topos – it may be read as an eulogy29 for the 
mêlée of subjectivity, of selves. Re-reading of the chapter from Nancy's book may turn out to be 
in many ways beneficial for the endeavor of transhumanism to become posthumanist. Not only 
that the discussion about the community that has gone through ethnic cleansing may offer 
insights into (an improper) coexistence with the other, but can also emphasize various threats of 
                                                 
 
28 Nancy initially published his book “Being Singular Plural” in 1996, less than a year after the war in Bosnia 
ended. Before the war, Sarajevo was a town famous for its religious, national and cultural fusions. Exactly these 
formerly celebrated categories were among causes for a four years long ongoing dread, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. In a chapter titled “Eulogy for the mêlée” Nancy uses Sarajevo as a metaphor for an inoperative 
community and a system for the reduction to identity. Sarajevo (that of the 1996) is an example of the negation of 
any sort of being-with, of differences and of hospitality.  
29 The author finds an act of writing a eulogy paradoxical, since a proper eulogy for the mêlée would be the 
one that wouldn't have to be given, due to the inability of identification or discerning (Nancy 2000: 147). He thus 
promises to give a eulogy that is itself a mixture, mélange – a eulogy with a reserve, the one unable to identify its 
object too precisely and in that manner to betray it. Nancy writes: “I am embarrassed by the idea of a “eulogy for the 
mélange” as if the mélange would have to be some sort of value or authenticity to be uncovered, even though it is 
only a piece of evidence, or, if one looks at it more closely, even though it does not exist if there is never anything 
“pure” that can be and must be “mixed” together (mélanger) with some other “purity”” (Nancy 2000: 149).  
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a simple opposite of negation of differences – it can indicate how a celebration of differences can 
also turn out to be nothing but a surface of the previous, and thus still an act of negation of 
being-with.  
 Understanding the difference between French expressions mêlée and mélange is of 
crucial importance for further discussion. Mélange could be translated as a heterogeneous 
mixture, that which has gone through the process of mixing. The most suitable translation of 
mêlée in this context would be to mix, mixing, stirring of heterogeneous elements – an action, 
rather than a substance or a finished process. The two expressions are of crucial importance for 
understanding of a(n inoperative) community as well as of a community of a new kind.  
 For Nancy, Sarajevo, and for the purposes of this analysis, being-with, should be a place 
(an entity) of mêlée, “a knot and an exchange, a disjunction, a circulation, a radiating (un 
étoilement)” (Nancy 2000: 145). A community does not require identification – of itself and of 
its members. The identification of the mixture's elements would confirm the heterogeneity and 
would contribute to an isolation (“of pure substances” (Nancy 2000: 147)). The process of 
identification is necessarily related to the confirmation of the sameness and exclusion of 
differences and of otherness, and is therefore in a sense contradictory to the singular plurality of 
being. Nancy gives a nice example of a painting that “never has anything to do with the spectrum 
of colors; it only has to do with the infinity mixed in with and derived from their nuances” 
(Nancy 2000: 147), and thus suggests movement towards mêlée, since giving too much identity 
to the mélange should be avoided. The author calls for a refusal of belief in such simplistic and 
homogeneous identities as Bosnian, Muslim, woman (or posthuman) would be. This call implies 
a description of webs, heterogeneous trajectories, assemblages, even a remaking of culture anew. 
Movement from a mélange towards mêlée has to be made, since the former is a simple 
(politically correct) celebration of multiculturalism and hybridization30, “a fragile thing, both 
subtle and volatile (...) and obscure these days” (Nancy 2000: 148).   
 Mélange is a mixture, a structure, a finished process to which a nature can be attributed – 
a structure that is identifiable. Mélange implies a risk of being essentialist, as its ingredients may 
                                                 
 
30 Both of which still consist of pure identities, and are thus insufficient just existing “as they are” (Nancy 
2000: 148).  
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become stable enough to make a mélange heterogeneous. Mélange has always-already taken 
place and Nancy suggests that it can be a mixture of two kinds, of two different identities:  
that of a fusion or a thoroughgoing osmosis, or that of an accomplished state of disorder (mise en désorder 
achevée). These two fantastical extremities are alchemy and entropy, extremities that, in the end, come 
together and identify with one another in an apocalypse or a black hole. (Nancy 2000: 150) 
The movement from mélange towards mêlée would thus be a movement from alchemy and 
entropy towards mêlée of fight and mêlée of love (Nancy 2000: 150). Mélange that is moving 
towards mêlée is that which happens rather than that which is. Mélange implies the finished 
process of an extraction of pure substances and of their amalgamation, whereas mêlée would 
imply the creation of an infinite spectrum of shades and nuances. The task is to accept identities 
as such – processes and constant ongoing identification – rather than closed structures. The 
discourse of simplification of the other raises the value of identity and its purity and is 
simultaneous with the discourse about the complementarity of moderate differences, that exact 
discourse designated with a certain kind of an intention, a discourse which is welcomed in moral 
and political urgency. Nevertheless, an identity can never be absolutely distinctive, and just as 
with the difference, it can never be fixed or pinned down. Thus the process, mêlée, has 
precedence over mélange, the substance. Mêlée implies weaving, crossings, exchanges, 
divisions; never one and the same thing. Freezing a frame in order to identify it attentively would 
mean a loss of the insight into a process, a whole; moments of the process to come would remain 
eternally lost.  
 Nancy writes that the first culture that consisted of different races and species, of homo 
erectus, homo faber and homo sapiens was a mêlée itself (Nancy 2000: 151). Cultures are mêlée 
since it cannot really be said that a certain culture is a mixture. Of course, cultures do encounter, 
modify and reconfigure each other, as the author suggests, even cultivate and drain each other 
(Nancy 2000: 151), since the movements and developments of culture are the movement and 
development of mêlée. Mêlée can also be described as that instance which determines various 
characteristics of every culture. It is originary and necessary rather than accidental and 
contingent (Nancy 2000: 156). Mêlée is that which makes being singular plural a process, since it 
keeps constantly occurring and happening. Just as every culture is always-already multicultural, 
so is the every community always-already a multitude.  
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 A eulogy for the mêlée is a critique of pure identities. Pure, complete, self-sufficient 
identities are among the greatest threats for any sort of community31, especially those of 
coexistence of radical alterities. Nancy goes further to claim that pure identity is not only 
dangerous, inert and empty, but also absurd, that which cancels itself by not being able to 
identify itself (Nancy 2000: 153). By being identical only to itself, by only mixing with itself, by 
identity performs autism, even auto-eroticism, remains trapped in loops and therefore fails to 
exist and remains utterly deprived of relations. Nancy poetically writes that “(p)urity is a 
crystalline chasm where the identical, the proper, the authentic is engulfed by itself; it is nothing 
at all, and it drags the other along in order to carry it into the abyss” (Nancy 2000: 154). An 
intact and pure identity is an empty place, an absence, since nothing is capable of existing pure, 
isolated and beyond any kind of boundaries with something else. The very existence of 
boundaries between the supposedly pure entity and the other implies a contact and therefore the 
inability of being intact.  
 Mêlée is that which insists on identities and communities to be plural and shared, since 
one of it modalities is that which Nancy describes as mêlée of Hermes: “a mêlée of messages and 
paths, bifurcations, substitutions, concurrences of codes, configurations of space, frontiers made 
to be passed through, so that there can be passages, but ones that are shared – because there is 
never any identity that is not shared: that is, divided, mixed up, distinguished, entrenched, 
common, substitutable, insubstitutable, withdrawn, exposed” (Nancy 2000: 157). The other, just 
as cities, is also a mêlée for itself – it has millions of citizens, incomprehensible chronotopes, 
numerous histories, secret passages as well as ancient cities ruined and hidden under the surface.  
 
3. 4. 6. Transhumanist mêlée: a rhizome 
The being-with of transhuman subjectivity would have to be a mêlée, that which keeps 
happening. It would have to be a creation of an infinite spectrum of shades and nuances and 
coexistence that is also a mêlée with all sorts of non-human subjectivity. The transhuman self 
would have to embrace its “illegitimate offspring” (Haraway 1991: 43) with both human and 
                                                 
 
31 Nancy writes: “With all due rigor, who was ever pure enough to be an Aryan worthy of the name?” (Nancy 
2000: 154), and thus reminds us of numerous dreadful examples of insisting on pure identities throughout history.  
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posthuman subjectivity, and to confirm itself as such, for a pure transhumanist identity (the one 
that is not mêlée) would remain an absurdity. As that which has gained supremacy over both 
human and non-human animals and over all sorts of marginalized human cultural identities, a 
pure transhumanist entity tends to be a possible answer to Nancy's question related to a 
subjectivity that would be “an Aryan worthy of the name” (Nancy 2000: 154).  
 Transhumanist mêlée has to be a rhizomatic32 identity: it has to have a great number of 
forms and to be consistent of likes, not points. Rhizomatic transhumanist identity cannot have a 
beginning nor an end, but has to merge in the middle. It should be a part of a complex 
environment and constantly open and susceptible to changes. Rhizomes are part of the multitude 
and are a multitude in themselves – never one, finished, but always (n-1) (Deleuze, Guattari 
1987: 6-7). The transhumanist mêlée should lean toward alliances and heterogeneous 
connections as well as to replace the exclusionary or with an affirmative and. Transhumanist 
subjectivity that coexists in a community with various forms of human and non-human 
subjectivity has to simultaneously think contradictory concepts and to be open to communities 
based on affinity, rather than on identity (Haraway 1991: 43). Rhizomatic subjectivity never 
exists alone and in isolation, but are constantly being deteritorialized and reteritorialized – they 
are part of chaosmosis (Guattari 2005: 32), of chaotic osmosis of variable connections, never of a 
strictly ordered cosmos. A strictly ordered cosmos would imply rigidity and in the best case an 
attempt at a mélange (that of pure identities). Transhuman subjectivity, as well as a community 
of transhuman and non-transhuman subjectivity, should not possibly be reducible to one, nor to a 
multitude: just as rhizomes are, it is made of dimensions and directions, not of units ((Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 14). Even the relation with the posthuman self should not be understood as a 
threat, since rhizomatic transhumanist subjectivity would have to function based on variations 
and expansion and not on a reproduction based on conquering (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 18). A 
transhuman identity that is a mêlée should be a self that is made of an infinite number of partial 
identities, that identity which simultaneously thinks oppositional perspectives and pushes and 
blurs all possible boundaries. Finally, it should be capable of disabling a possibility of existence 
                                                 
 
32 Rhizome is a philosophical concept developed by Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze in the first volume 
“Anti-Oedipus” of their work “Capitalism and Schizophrenia” (1972). In the second volume, titled “A Thousand 
Pleteaus” written in 1980, the authors developed principles of the rhizome.  
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of any sort of matrices that could serve the purpose of constituting essentialist identities. 
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4. SEMIOTICIZING OTHERNESS 
 
The notion of the rewriting of boundaries has been touched upon several times now, and this 
issue may be considered as a semiotic issue par excellence. The importance of more attentive 
thinking of the notion of boundaries is invaluable for any sort of further inquiry into the 
weaknesses, opportunities or threats to transhuman subjectivity; thus it should be analyzed more 
thoroughly. The call made for being to be understood as being-with, for identities to be 
rhizomatic and dialectical-integrative, is a call for the (semiotic) remodeling of subjectivity. One 
of the most important features of Juri Lotman's model of semiosphere (Lotman 2005) is precisely 
the notion of boundary, and thus (and also for other reasons, which will be stated in pages to 
come) this model appears as the most suitable for this purpose. Not only is this model helpful for 
rethinking the boundaries of transhuman subjectivity, but Lotman's description of the 
mechanisms of translation, of dialogue between center and periphery, as well as isomorphism 
between part and a whole also offer precious insights. Further on, although he belongs to a 
tradition that is similar but in many aspects very far from Lotman's, relating Derrida’s analysis of 
aporia(s) to Lotman's problematization of intersemiotic translation (or rather, untranslatability) 
seems fruitful and may offer insights of great importance for remodeling subjectivity. The 
problem of untranslatability appears as the instance that may enrich the being-with of the 
transhuman and its otherness – the other transhuman subjects, the foreign, still incomprehensible 
posthuman other, as well as those types of non-transhuman otherness that precede it – human and 
non-human animals. Untranslatability is also the instance that may contribute to an endeavor or a 
fight against perfectly coded language, as proposed by Donna Haraway. Finally, as Lotman 
suggests, untranslatability produces explosions and new meaning, and this issue has to be 
necessarily emphasized in order for the transhuman subjectivity to be understood as that which 
can truly overcome the limitations and burden created by humanism (especially that of the Age 
of Reason).   
 
4. 1. Semiosphere(s) of the self and the other 
If hospitality has to do with doorsteps and thresholds, community with acceptance and 
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exclusions, identity with limits and openness, then the question of boundaries – a genuinely 
semiotic one – is at the core of understanding the coexistence of the transhuman with the non-
transhuman. Semiotization of both the self and the other has to start with a questioning of their 
boundaries. In order to suggest the semiotic model of subjectivity or identity that can contribute 
to the coexistence of the transhuman self with its other, first it has to be noted that the proceeding 
analysis will be a simultaneous modeling of the isomorphic semiospheres of the transhuman self, 
the semiospheres of transhuman selves, as well as the semiospheres of its Other – posthuman, 
human and non-human animals.  
 Lotman writes that meaning is not possible without sharing and communication, as well 
as that dialogue that necessarily comes before language and even makes it possible (Lotman 
2005: 218). His model of the semiosphere is a confirmation of Nancy's premise that being-with 
always comes before being, since Lotman, while describing his model, states that  
the ensemble of semiotic formations precedes (not heuristically but functionally) the singular isolated 
language and becomes a condition for the existence of the latter. Semiosphere itself consist semiotics 
monads, languages and other meaningful units. Minimal meaning-generating mechanism needs at least two 
coding system through which it gives meaning to non-semiotic reality. Thus, without the semiosphere, 
language is not possible. The different substructures of the semiosphere are linked in their interaction and 
cannot function without the support of each other. (Lotman 2005: 218-219) 
Lotman's concept of the semiosphere is in a sense a response to the limitations of two famous 
lines of understanding of the basic semiotic concepts: Peirce-Morris' line emphasizes the sign as 
the most important element of a sign system (which is necessarily the succession of a sign), as 
well as Saussure's double formulation of the sign and opposition between language and text 
(Lotman 2005: 205 – 206). As an analogy to Vernadsky's concept of the biosphere, Lotman 
suggests a semiotic continuum in which mono-semantic systems33 are immersed and “which is 
filled with multi-variant semiotic models situated at a range of hierarchical levels” (Lotman 
2005: 206). The semiosphere is thus a multitude of individual isolated entities (due to his 
tradition, Lotman refers to texts and languages) that are in a certain manner related. Lotman uses 
organicistic metaphors in order to describe the model more accurately. What makes the 
                                                 
 
33 Lotman claims that mono-semantic never exist in isolation (Lotman 2005: 206), and could be thus 
designated as being-with. 
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semiosphere more suitable for modeling the self and the other for the current purposes is the fact 
that primacy is not given to signs, but to a “greater system”, a semiotic continuum outside of 
which semiosis cannot happen (Lotman 2005: 206).  
 Previously understood as impermeable, boundaries of the self in the context of 
semiosphere are rather seen as “bilingual translatable ‘filters’, passing through which the text is 
translated into another language (or languages) situated outside the given semiosphere” (Lotman 
2005: 209). As such, the boundaries of the self are rather a sum of points than a clearly drawn 
line. As a filtering mechanism that translates incomprehensible foreign content into the known 
and familiar, the main function of the boundary is not only to protect, defend and to limit 
penetration, but to semiotize content. It serves the purpose of translation of external 
communication into something internal and comprehensive, as well as the other way around. The 
boundary of the semiosphere of the self thus cannot be simply understood as a limit, a dead end, 
a thick border – but rather as a frontier and a threshold; as that instance which enables any sort of 
communication with external, non-semiotic space. External and non-semiotic spaces are often 
designated as chaotic, although they only appear as a different kind of order or organization.  
 Lotman writes that “a person who [...] belongs to two worlds, operates as a kind of 
interpreter, settling in the territorial periphery, on the boundary of cultural and mythological 
space, whilst the sanctuary of ‘culture’ confines itself to the deified world situated at the center” 
(Lotman 2005: 211), and in a certain sense this person, this interpreter, may be compared to 
Derrida's monstrous gatekeeper. Its nature is bilingual, or even multilingual, and as that which 
ensures semiotic contact between two universes it is prone to the aforementioned illegitimate 
fusions and resists any sort of essentialist categorization. In a sense, it is desirable for 
transhuman subjectivity to always remain at the core of the boundary, as gatekeeper, that which 
will remain rebellious towards the humanist burden of supremacy and exceptionalism. Even 
more so, it is desirable for transhuman subjectivity to be that which unites and divides two 
spheres of semiosis that are otherness to it as well as to each other: human and non-human (and 
by necessarily including non-human animals and posthuman subjectivity, this would make the 
transhuman the entity that unites much more than two other semiospheres). As a gatekeeper, 
transhuman subjectivity would also serve another function and would have other features of this 
semiotic boundary – it would represent the area of “accelerated semiotic processes, which always 
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flow more actively on the periphery of cultural environments, seeking to affix them to the core 
structures, with a view to displacing them” (Lotman 2005: 212). A kind of subjectivity that tends 
towards the periphery is therefore constantly enriched, and ultimate hospitality thus necessarily 
means further development and flourishing. External structures are often encompassed and 
turned into another periphery, and in turn (due to both semiotic and economic growth), the 
former center is challenged and conquered (Lotman 2005: 212). The dynamics between the 
center and the periphery continue and the dialogue between the two is preserved. Nevertheless, 
this indicates another rule of organization of a semiosphere – that of internal irregularity. Lotman 
explains how core or nuclear structures may rise to a state of self-description and become rigid, 
and thus unable to adjust to the very moment: “If one of these nuclear structures not only holds a 
dominant position, but also rises to a state of self-description, thereby separating itself from the 
system of meta-languages, with the help of which it describes not only itself but also the 
peripheral space of a given semiosphere, then the level of its ideal unity creates a superstructure 
which itself is above the irregularity of a real semiotic map” (Lotman 2005: 213). This is exactly 
what happens when, in a semiosphere of white male professional European humans, having risen 
to a state of self-description, the rigidity (of strict boundaries of what a desirable “human” can 
(not) be) has been increased to such great extent that its development has been slowed down34. 
While the development of the center is slowed, the peripheral areas continue to burgeon. Internal 
irregularity thus indicates the displacement of the core to the periphery (of the previous stage), so 
that the former periphery becomes a center of a semiotic system.  
 Thus, this is another feature that gives to a semiosphere prevalence over other semiotic 
formations for this current purpose, since it enables the aforementioned possibility of 
simultaneous modeling of isomorphic semiospheres of the transhuman self, semiospheres of 
transhuman selves, as well as semiospheres of its Other – posthuman, human and non-human 
animals. The dialogue between the center and the periphery, as an internal diversity of the 
semiosphere, necessarily also indicates the integrity of the system. Lotman writes that parts and 
                                                 
 
34  Obviously, such generalizations have been present even in periods that are not designated as peaks of 
humanism. Examples of achievements of racial, gender and national otherness that have risen from the periphery to 
become a center are numerous throughout history. This generalization, however, is very problematic, but is 
nevertheless suitable for these purposes.  
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wholes of semiospheres are related to each other as parts and wholes of an organism, making 
“the essential feature of the structural formation of the core mechanism of the semiosphere the 
fact that each of its parts creates its own whole, isolated in its structural independence” (Lotman 
2005: 215), and thus revealing an isomorphic quality – elements of any semiosphere are 
simultaneously a whole and its likeness (Lotman 2005: 215). Vertical isomorphism between the 
semiospheres of, for example, transhuman and posthuman selves, thus creates the quantitative 
increase in their communication.  
 
4. 1. 1. Translation 
Finally, the structural heterogeneity of semiospheres in Lotman's opinion implies reserves of 
dynamic processes and is a mechanism for the creation of new information. Boundaries and 
peripheries as areas of increased dynamic processes and semiotic exchanges consist of fragments 
of structures, and their position enables frequent contact with the other. Thus, in these areas 
meaning generation appears to be enhanced. The author suggests that “the eternal flow in culture 
of specific reserves of text with lost codes leads to the process of creation of new codes” 
(Lotman 2005: 215), new languages, and thus once again confirms the necessity of boundaries to 
be seen as permeable filters, rather than limitations.  
 Any sort of communication between two or more different entities, then, implies facing a 
multitude of boundaries, and therefore a certain kind of impossibility. The existence of 
boundaries in this process suggests that their crossing, their translation, is desirable, even though 
the content on both sides is so different that the two realities cannot be fully equated. According 
to Lotman and Uspenski, for culture in general there also exist types of culture that move 
towards closeness, types of anti-culture. The crossing of so-called filtering membranes is also a 
search for a common language between realities – one that could semiotize the external into the 
internal and translate meaning as accurately as possible. The existence of at least two different 
languages – or rather sign systems – is necessary, since one is not enough to enable adequate 
reflection of the overall reality. Multitudes of different sign systems give rise to different 
tensions which, as Lotman suggests, initiate explosions – which are desirable, for they in turn 
give rise to new meanings and the generation of new information. Explosions of this kind are 
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often unpredictable future events, but it should be noted that they are also very different than the 
Derridian understanding of the unpredictable à venir. After the initial tension and explosion 
comes the period of making sense of the event of explosion, of fixing it within structures (of 
memory and the like). Unlike explosions, à venir never actualizes, the arrivant always remains in 
the process of coming or emerging and the tension never ends. 
 Nevertheless, translation between various sign systems (initial untranslatability) implies 
description and development and therefore also enrichment of – on a greater scale – culture in 
general. Both interlingual and intersemiotic translations are inexhaustible sources of 
autocommunication of culture. Lotman’s writing on boundaries and (un)translatability is not only 
relevant for the description of cultural phenomena, but as another argument for post-structuralist 
treatments of power relations, with a focus on the problems of otherness. The problem(s) of 
otherness are related to the constitution of subjectivity and identity and can be expanded to a 
culture in general. The impossibility of translation and constant efforts to make it possible 
necessarily create new meanings, since a multitude of different sign systems is used in order to 
more accurately transfer meaning.  
 Translation between radically different semiospheres is therefore in a certain sense based 
on the condition of its untranslatability. As such, boundaries of semiospheres, as entities that 
have an impossibility as a condition of their possibility, are similar to the Derridian 
understanding of aporia. For the purpose of further analysis, this coincidence has to be analyzed 
more thoroughly, and the semiotic approach to translation has to be juxtaposed to the 
philosophical.  
 
4. 1. 2. Derridian haunting multi-fold aporia(s) 
The philosophical concept of translation is, just as the semiotic, wider than the linguistic one. It 
refers to any sort of interpretation or decoding of the foreign into the familiar. The very fact that 
something implies interpretation of the foreign into the familiar indicates a relation to the issue 
of otherness. Derrida writes about the relation of the aforementioned à venir and translation, or 
rather, of the impossibility of translation, in his book “Aporias: Dying – Awaiting (One Another 
At) the “Limits of Truth”” (2003). An understanding of the Derridian usage of the notion of 
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aporias35 opens a space for understanding the final à venir in a situation where translation is no 
longer possible. Such is the situation of the encounter of the transhuman self with its radical 
alterity, the posthuman. The author describes aporia as  
the difficult or the impracticable, here the impossible passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, 
indeed the non passage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming, or of a future advent 
(événement de venue ou d'avenir), which no longer has the form of the movement that consists in passing, 
traversing, or transiting. It would be “coming to pas” of an event that would no longer have the form or the 
appearance of a pas: in sum, a coming without pas. (Derrida 1996: 8). 
As the author writes in this book about mourning and dying (as a limiting concept that cannot be 
experienced by the one who is dying), the question implied in the above quotation is the one 
related to what it means to trespass the border, a boundary that separates two worlds – that of 
living and that of death – and it is certainly a question, not a confirmation of the existence of 
boundaries, in this case impermeable aporias.  
 The notion of aporia is common for issues that permeate many of Derrida's works – for 
hospitality, mourning, forgiveness and (gift) giving. Aporia is exactly that instance that renders a 
thought about these concepts paradoxical, since for the author aporia is that which constitutes 
both the condition of possibility and that of impossibility for all four instances. The resolution of 
this paradox is not achievable by taking into an account the opposite of apoira - poros and 
diaporein, which have been seen as a possible route out of the initial difficulty (of aporia)36 for a 
long time. The existence of aporias implies the situation of a transition from “a familiar space to 
one that is not familiar: it is a passage from one stage to another and vice versa, from light to 
obscurity or the other way around” (Kofman 1983: 45).  
 The resolving of an aporia has been problematic for the entire history of thought about 
this notion, and Derrida finally calls for a new type of aporia (rather than a new understanding of 
the old concept) that would imply the arrival of the expected future advent of the event to be 
                                                 
 
35 Derrida calls for (or rather insists on) a usage of the plural form of the word aporia, since it disables the 
possibility of creation of “an institution of indivisible lines” (Derrida 1996: 11) and since boundaries are always 
multi-sided.  
36 Aristotle has carefully investigated notions of poros, diaporein and aporia in his “Metaphysics” and thus 
has set foundations for their further understanding. There is no need to describe his understanding more thoroughly 
for the purposes of this analysis, since Derridian understanding is sufficient for further investigation into the issue of 
translation.  
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unrelated to  
the passage of what happens or comes to pass. In this case, there would be an aporia because there is not 
even any space for an aporia determined as experience of the step or of the edge, crossing or not of some 
line, relation to some spatial figure of the limit. (Derrida 1996: 21) 
Put simply, it would be an aporia that refuses the possibility of the aporia and of the trespassing 
of boundaries in general. The author suggests that resolving aporias by following pre-determined 
courses is not a possibility, in addition to all aporias being temporary (Derrida 1996: 23). Even 
though aporias have always been associated with the unbridgeable, infinite voids, abysses, as 
foreign and as hostile worlds, Derrida writes that all aporetic problems in discourse can be solved 
and paths can be made, regardless of the language. Imagining the figuration of a new type of 
aporia is impossible, since it encompasses all the other existing types of aporias – it is a plurality 
of intermingling aporias that haunt each other infinitely.  
 Derridian scholar Jean Paul Martinon describes the first type of which the new type of 
aporia is consistent as that which is in a sense an impermeability or an uncrossable border, 
whereas the second type is its opposite and originates from the impossibility of the existence of 
limitations, from the lack of opposition between two sides (Martinon 2007: 119). The third, new 
type of aporia that Derrida calls for is thus an impossibility, negation of the passage,  
an impasse itself that would be impossible; the coming or the new future advent of the event would have no 
relation to the passage of what happens or comes to pass (...) There would not even be any space for the 
aporia because of a lack of topographical conditions, or, more radically, because of a lack of the 
topological condition itself. (Derrida 1996: 20) 
Three types of aporias are now understood as intermingled, many-fold, and haunting each other 
– an impassable dead end; untranslatability. Derrida even denies the very possibility of 
identifying the moment of encounter with the aporia, but he mentions elsewhere that a new type 
of aporia is simultaneously concerned with ontology and with thought and language. As an 
essential part of both language and ontological fields, aporias are the instances that are always 
present in lives (just as much as in death, about which Derrida writes in his book on aporias), 
without its necessary acknowledgement, “it follows us like our very own shadow and yet it never 
belongs to us properly” (Derrida 1996: 12).  
 Derrida calls for the creation of a braid of three different aporias, which should not be 
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considered as an object or a structure, but rather as an infinite weaving and unweaving of itself; 
that which is eternally haunted by what escapes it. The infinite weaving of non-paths – the 
impossibility – is once again that instance which renders these boundaries, borders, thresholds 
and limits necessary.  
 
4. 1. 3. Untranslatability as a condition for cyborg politics  
For various disciplines among the so-called liberal humanities as well as posthumanities, 
otherness derives its essence from Derrida’s notion of différance. Otherness is always in a sense 
related to the untranslatability and (a crossing of) boundaries. Donna Haraway has, for example, 
tried to explain how both différance and untranslatability may be key weapons in resistance 
against oppression, in this case against the totalitarian power of white heterosexual male 
Christian professional Western domination (Haraway 1991: 20). Resistance is directed towards 
translation of the world into a problem of perfectly exact coding and situations in which 
signifiers signify clearly defined, unambiguous, stable signifieds. This sub-chapter is an analysis 
of how and why Lotman’s concepts of boundaries and translation (or rather, untranslatability), as 
well as Derridian difference are relevant for the further remodeling of transhuman subjectivity 
and its coexistence with not just posthuman subjectivities, but non-transhuman subjectivities in 
general.  
 For this purpose, Donna Haraway's conception of cyborg politics37 (Haraway 1991: 32) 
as (among other things) a critique of totalitarian language turns out as an instance that may 
contribute to the analysis of untranslatability to a great extent. Haraway suggests that noise in 
communication and untranslatability may be elements of crucial importance in the fight against 
oppression.  
 As mentioned, boundaries should be understood as sums of points and bilingual 
translatable filters, rather than fixed impermeable structures. These slippery, permeable margins 
are then a key notion for understanding Haraway’s concept of cyborg politics. It is also the 
                                                 
 
37 Haraway's notion of cyborg politics is, put simply, a politics of (already described) cyborg ontology. 
Cyborg politics implies a call for a constant reading of webs of power relations, for communities based on affinity 
rather than on identity and for a fight against a perfect code (Haraway 1991: 39).  
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foundation of a cyborg, whose identity would be richer due to (mis)communication at this fluid, 
hottest spot of the semiosphere. 
 Problems arise with regard to translating content into a reality that lays on the other side 
of these permeable filters. Translation presumes the existence of two or more different sign 
systems, which together would reflect reality with some accuracy. A bilingual or multilingual 
structure is a minimal functional structure, since a single language or point of view gives rise to 
“worse illusions than double vision or many-headed monsters” (Haraway 1991: 44). The 
necessity of the existence of aggregates of independent and different languages represents an 
opposition to the centuries old ideal of a single ideal language which would be sufficient for the 
expression of reality. The tower of Babel had to collapse, since what its top would have reached 
are exactly the illusions and monsters that Haraway warns about – burdens of the Enlightenment 
embodied in God, Truth, the One, the Absolute and the Final (Haraway 1991: 35). The need for a 
multitude of languages is not a deficit, but a simple precondition. It is not just a requirement for 
other languages, but for other entities in general: for other subjectivities and other cultures. But 
the other has its own structures that can never be translated and understood, its own chronotopes 
that can never be fully perceived. Even when relationships of adequacy are established between 
two entities, untranslatability and/or limited translatability arise. Both represent a sort of 
adjustment of extra-systemic objects to their reflection within the system. Situations in which 
partial adequacy between systems is established often result in imprecise, approximate 
equivalences which “provoke new semantic connections and give rise to texts that are in 
principle new ones” (Lotman 1990: 37). Untranslatability is a condition for meaning generation 
in the sense that complex relationships between translatable and untranslatable elements of 
incommensurable systems generate the conditions for meaning generation. Large degrees of 
untranslatability also imply a great potential for the creation of new meanings, according to 
Lotman. Incommensurability, as the impossibility of adequately representing one element within 
another system, arises especially in the case of translation between discreet and non-discrete 
texts. Mutually equivalent relationships are rarely established between the units of two systems, 
and such attempts at translations of the untranslatable are both most valuable and most tempting 
and constitute “one of the most important features of creative thinking” (Lotman 1990: 37). 
Creative resistance is part of Haraway’s cyborg politics. It is a call for expressions that are 
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composed of contradictory, untranslatable entities that would serve as an act against suppression. 
Communication is more valuable and informative in the case of difficult and inadequate 
translations between non-intersecting spheres, and translation of the untranslatable is thus a 
carrier of information of the highest value (Lotman 1990).  
 In order to describe how untranslatability may be useful for the coexistence of 
transhuman and non-transhuman subjectivities, Derrida’s notion of différance (Derrida 1998: 14) 
also has to be described, for it is essential for further inquiry. In his book “Of Grammatology” 
written in 1967, Derrida has stated that truth and knowledge are only existent on the level of the 
signifier, ie. that truth is a matter of what one can say or write and is being done by relaying on 
the Other (Derrida 1998: 43), and this is where he seriously questioned the whole Western 
tradition of thought. An important part of this book is his re-reading (or rather, deconstruction, 
instead of a critique) of Saussure’s ideas, among which is the relation between speech and 
writing38. The author also questions the implications of what remains in Saussure’s works if 
logocentism (which is a consequence of phonocentrism) is removed from it, which brings him 
closer to the description of his notion of différance. Derrida explains that meaning is not situated 
in the signifier, but exists in a relation of signs, in a network (Derrida 1998: 73). Thus he 
radically questions the idea of one final, ultimate meaning, and also the existence of Truth. 
Différance comes before being and is placed in the very core of existence, instead of essence. 
Nothing can be outside of Saussure’s system of differences and therefore absolute identities are 
not possible. Derrida explains that the description of one entity is always based on exclusion. He 
uses the example of nature and culture, and how nature is always explained as the absence of 
                                                 
 
38  Derrida states that Saussure was prone to phonocentrism, and that linguistics itself gives precedence to 
speech over writing. Writing is considered to be secondary and nothing more than the transcription of speech. 
Saussure, according to Derrida, accused writing of being, in many ways, monstrous, sinful, perverted and tyrannical 
(Derrida 1998: 32). On the other hand, he claims that writing keeps signifying even in the author’s absence, even 
though readers may not have any access to the author’s intended meaning (Derrida 1998: 57). Meaning is therefore 
something that is perpetually being produced as opposed to one finished, immanent structure. Writing endangers the 
Western logocentric tradition in which ideas - which come first - are actualized in speech, and then transcribed in 
writing. At very core of logocentrism is meaning, and the signified is existent firstly in the sphere of pure 
consciousness and is then actualized in its external form in language. Derrida also claims that pure and free-standing 
signified entities (or ideas) are not existent, and considers the search for the transcendental signified (the only 
meaning which determines all other meanings – one, ultimate Truth) to be absurd (Derrida 1998: 60). Also, if 
meaning is considered to be an effect of language, and not its cause, these notions lose their transcendental status 
(Derrida 1998: 61). 
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culture. One term cannot be excluded from the meaning of the other, and therefore meaning 
depends on differences. It also implies postponing (defer-ing)39, especially if one signifier differs 
from the other and therefore defers meanings which it produces (Derrida 1998: 78). 
Logocentrism implies the existence of pure meaning and final truths, but in both speech and 
writing only the signifier is present, and the presence of meaning as a pure idea is postponed 
(deferred), suppressed, and suspended by the signifier. 
 This insight into Derridian deconstruction once again brings us close to his notion of the 
metaphysics of presence and the paradox of possibility. Following his line of thought, one could 
say that the impossible is the only possibility, since what is possible is both possible and 
impossible to happen. The impossible, on the other hand, is definitely impossible to happen, and 
is therefore the only possible option. Différance is thus neither active nor passive; it is a process. 
It is the only source of meaning and has no content. Derrida makes this notion even more 
complicated and states how it is neither present nor transcendent; that it is not even a notion nor a 
word. Finally, Derrida writes about the impossibility of mentioning any notion in speech and not 
recalling its transcription, so writing therefore always penetrates speech (Derrida 1998: 82). 
Saussure’s double articulation of signs, the closed and finished circle, may indicate that every 
signifier carries its own one and only meaning. But deconstruction, with its suggestion that 
neither signifier nor signified, but différance is the only source of meaning, moves meaning 
towards undecidability and through this process democratizes language and helps overcome 
highly hierarchical binary oppositions. Finally, Derrida opens up a new space for interpretations 
and analysis and suggests that meanings are not given nor guaranteed but lived, and therefore 
prone to questioning and mutations. 
 The central dogma of phallogocentrism, one code that translates all meaning perfectly, is 
at the heart of the resistance against perfect communication. It is precisely this which Donna 
Haraway calls cyborg politics – the struggle for language(s) filled with noise, pollution and 
illegitimate fusions. She writes in a context that is designated within the tradition of progress, 
racism, white male domination, capitalism and the constitution and reproduction of subjectivity 
                                                 
 
39 In French language word différer means both to differentiate and to defer or postpone. 
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in relation to the other. Haraway founds her critique of socialist-feminism on a statement that, 
just as in other forms of feminism, is another tearing down in the search for new matrices for 
essential identities, and thus wrong (Haraway 1991: 52). Finally, she describes cyborg politics as 
a force that can generate language and gender and thus subvert structures of the reproduction of 
dominant categories of identities as well as problematic binary oppositions:  
With no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis promising protection from 
hostile “masculine” separation, but written into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or 
salvation history, to recognize “oneself” as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root 
politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity, and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race 
teaches about the power of the margins. (Haraway 1991: 54) 
Haraway thus calls for humor and seriousness, and for simultaneous acknowledgment and usage 
of contradictory and incompatible entities since both/all of them are necessary and correct 
(Haraway 1991: 48). She calls for responsibility in the construction of the boundaries of various 
semiospheres, being aware of their importance and understanding their function in a way very 
close to Lotman. But she also calls for deriving pleasure from the confusion of boundaries – 
blasphemy in the construction of identity. She uses the metaphor of the cyborg in order to 
describe a new kind of subjectivity that would be a desirable entity in a post-gender world:  
it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic 
wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. The cyborg is 
resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and 
completely without innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg 
defines a technological polls based partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. 
Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation 
by the other. (Haraway 1991: 59) 
The cyborg is the gatekeeper of a boundary and at the same time it represents the transgression 
of a boundary. Haraway reminds readers that the consequences for feminism of overall 
textualization in post-structuralist theory are reflected in the neglect of relations of domination 
that are based in a playful arbitrary reading (Haraway 1991: 52). The myth of the cyborg 
promises to subvert organic wholes such as literary forms (she gives the example of poetry), 
primitive cultures, and similar constructs (Haraway 1991: 65). Indisputably, political struggle 
against perfect codes offers coalitions based on affinity, rather than identity, as well as a model 
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of oppositional consciousness, political identity that entails skills for reading and understanding 
webs of power relations. Webs of power relations have to be deconstructed by those who bear 
negative identities, or are exempted from stable categories of race, class and gender – but also 
species.  
 Finally, Haraway explains more thoroughly why noise and untranslatability are necessary 
for this new kind of politics. She gives the example of communication sciences, where the 
translation of the world as a problem of coding is characterized by cybernetic systems theory, 
feedback loops, command and control communication (Haraway 1991: 74). These are systems 
where each signifier has to have one clearly definable, unambiguous signified. The metaphor is 
extended to social reality, where each social practice or social role has to function according to 
the same mechanism. And this is what Haraway criticizes – gender identity cannot be based on 
exclusive or fixed categories. It should be an affirmative rather than negative identity, 
simultaneously male and female (transhuman as well as the non-transhuman), thus going beyond 
these categories and making them irrelevant. If it were put in Lotman’s dictionary and modeled 
as a semiosphere, cyborg identity would be multilingual gatekeeper, always placed in the center 
of a margin. Just like Derridian différance, cyborg subjectivity is not a complete entity but a 
process; absence rather than presence. It is always immersed in a network from which it derives 
meaning. 
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5. TRANSHUMANISM AND OTHERNESS IN TELEVISION SERIES „ÄKTA MÄNNISKOR” 
 
The theoretical framework provided above enriches certain aspects of transhumanism with an 
alternative approach to the problem of being-with the radically different other. As for the chosen 
transhuman self the figure of ultimate otherness (the posthuman other) is that which has not 
emerged yet, giving unambiguous, rigid answers and setting clear, certain hypothesis has to be 
avoided. In a sense, the posthuman self is that entity that suits the Derridian description of 
l’arrivant, as it may remain in a constant process of emergence and may not ever realize itself 
fully. L’arrivant should not be understood as a person nor as a subject, as with the posthuman 
self. For lack of a better figure to which the theoretical framework can be applied, a fictional 
representation must be chosen. Scientific assumptions of what posthuman otherness might be 
like are represented in a vast scope of literary and cinematographic achievements. Many of them 
are incredibly interesting, but among them the Swedish television series „Äkta Människor” has 
been chosen for its recent popularity and due to its carefully constructed relations between 
human, transhuman and posthuman selves.  
 The plot of the series has members of the fictional organization “Real Humans” fight for 
the extinction of hubots from society, since they are perceived as a threat to the quality of human 
lives. Though the organization is named “Real Humans”, many of its members can be designated 
as transhumans, due to their usage of either cognitive, mood or physical enhancements. This is 
interesting as it brings back one of the oldest questions in transhumanist debates – how many 
implants or enhancements does it take before a person stops being human, and becomes 
transhuman?  
 As hubots in the series have been created wholly anew, without ever being humans, they 
may be considered as posthuman entities. The only unquestionable transhuman in the series, as is 
aforementioned, is Leo, whose father saved his life after an accident in his childhood by using 
both nano- and biotechnology. By asserting the humanist values of exceptionalism and 
supremacy, members of the organization “Real Humans” are unable to think the Other, and are 
incapable of contemplating differences, as well as of thinking, differently. Through numerous 
public campaigns during the first season of the series, they attempt to reach out to the wider 
public and gain support. But in a community consisting of other humans, there are also those 
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who are celebrating and praising their hubots. This kind of adoration cannot be seen as a 
transcendence of humanist limitations, but only as its repetition and further confirmation.  
 The notion of l’arrivant that is afoot, unknown and unthinkable by the present, the one 
that breaks all of the rules, does not completely fit the figure of liberated hubots presented in the 
series. Nevertheless, as the Derridian metaphor has been overused by now, it might be slightly 
adjusted for the current purposes, as it is the most suitable, regardless the differences. The arrival 
of liberated hubots predicted in the end of the first season of the series, just as Derridian à-venir, 
has undoubtedly initiated a change in the direction in which society as a whole has been headed. 
Morals, laws and rules have been interrupted and finitude was rethought. What is still yet to 
come40 is provoking unexpected junctures and disjointedness. The few glimpses that the 
audience has into the being and activities of liberated hubots witnesses a ruptured, disobedient 
posthuman otherness that escapes mastery and determinable grounds; entities that break all of the 
rules and resist every attempt of normalization and purification. Arriving otherness indeed does 
bear the possibility of repetition, as Derrida suggests (Derrida 2002:83), by the further liberation 
of other hubots, the creation of new and repair of old, neglected ones. A tone of messianicity is 
present in the arrival of this radical alterity; messianicity without religion in this case. 
Messianicity is present also in the other sense that has also been described by Derrida – that of 
remaining (trapped) in the state of the emergence.  
 Liberated hubots, just as l’arrivant does, arrive when they are least expected, where they 
are least expected. They approach the thresholds of households without invitation, and require 
unconditional hospitality and acceptance. Leo and Mimi, two main characters, together with 
several other hubots, require coexistence that transcends hierarchy. The family in which Mimi 
lived and worked before the liberation did offer her unconditional hospitality, even when the 
integrity of the family was threatened. As the ones who have offered help, members of the family 
have waited for other liberated hubots, without knowing for whom they have been waiting, nor 
whether their guests will be Messiahs or monsters.  
 When in one of the episodes of “Äkta människor” Inger makes her argument about how 
hubots should be included as equal members of a society, she speaks exactly about hospitality. 
                                                 
 
40 The second season of the series is in the process of post-production during the writing of this thesis. 
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She mentions historical examples of how Western society has not allowed various forms of 
cultural otherness to pass its threshold, leaving them on margins: women, slaves, foreigners. Not 
offering a free pass over the threshold, hospitality into a home, resulted in leaving the other not 
only physically, but also morally, legally and culturally secluded. Inger warns about repeating 
the age-old mistake of not offering unconditional participation into society, whose consequences 
are evident in various dreads and terrors throughout history.  
 The new reading of the notion of community implies an embrace of radical otherness as 
well as an offering of absolute hospitality. Nancy’s challenge to the traditional understanding of 
a community is a challenge to supporters of the movement “Real Humans” – to a community that 
rests on exclusiveness and is self-enclosed (Nancy: 1991), to a community which rests upon an 
exclusionary myth of a sense of unity among humans. The desirable kind of community, on the 
other hand, is the one where being is understood as being-with hubots, where identity always 
necessarily includes otherness. The new modality, being-with, implies all the threats suggested 
by Nancy’s reading of Derrida’s theoretization of hospitality – threats of being exposed or being 
abandoned by hubots used as help and company. Being exposed to hubots by referring to them, 
trusting them and by believeing in them. Humans and hubots cannot exist in isolation in as much 
as mutual exclusion or ignorance would harm the existence of both. The human self necessarily 
had to open its boundaries and become a multitude, to become singular plural with its ultimate 
other, since, as Nancy suggests, the self only exists through sharing of the world (Nancy 2000: 
29). And this sharing of the world, but also communication between human owners and hubots, 
happens with the otherness of the other;  since the other only exists in its otherness. Thus the 
being of the transhuman self has to be being-with all the other selves, whether human, 
posthuman or the non-human. Being-with posthuman selves has to imply weaving, crossings, 
exchange; it has to be a process, it has to be mêlée; and that is exactly what liberated hubots are 
demanding. The emphasis on a rebellious life that liberated hubots are living, designated as 
“amoral” by the society of transhumans and humans, in a sense functions as a confirmation of 
the need for the impurity of posthuman identities, for incompleteness as opposed to complete and 
self-sufficient identities, which are seen as some of the greatest threats for this alternative 
reading of the notion of community – for coexistence with the radical other. The pure identities 
of members of the “Real Humans” organization are not only dangerous and inert, according to 
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Nancy, but even absurd (Nancy 2000: 153).  An example of a community that would be closest 
to the one suggested by Nancy is the community between Leo, the transhuman, and other 
liberated (posthuman) hubots. It is a kind of alliance constituted and based on affinity, rather 
than on identity. Swedish society as depicted in the series would have to embrace its “illegitimate 
offspring”, as Haraway refers to it (Haraway 1991: 43), with both transhuman and the posthuman 
selves.  
 Where the author of the series failed to break free from the humanist burden is in the 
process of constructing the identities of hubots – they are still too simple, too human, instead of 
being infinite numbers of partial identities, multitudes, those identities that push and blur all 
possible boundaries.  
 The boundaries of the semiospheres of posthuman selves cannot be understood as 
impermeable, thick borders that separate what is inside from the outside, and the boundaries of 
transhuman selves should not be conceived as such either. Leo is in a sense a person that indeed 
does belong to two worlds and operates as an interpreter, just as Lotman wrote about the 
gatekeepers, beings of the boundaries (Lotman 2005: 211). Leo ensures semiotic contact between 
the two opposed universes. Leo and Inger, the two persons that mediate in conflicts, are initially 
set on the periphery of society, but as their nature is, in Lotman’s words, multilingual, their roles 
quickly get displaced to the core of the events. 
 Finally, Inger’s call for the inclusion of otherness in society is that which provokes new 
semantic connections, gives rise to new texts and enriches society overall; it is that which invites 
the audience to wait patiently until the premier of the second season. The incomprehensibility of 
hubots by humans and transhumans, the struggle of hubots against the perfect codes that would 
perfectly translate all meaning, as well as the dialogue between centre and periphery, is what 
leaves this media text open for interpretation.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This is how it should be done: lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find 
an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, 
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by 
segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus”, 2004: 
161)  
Anticipation of the issue that is yet-to-come and that has to do with that which is still unthinkable 
and impossible to grasp is an ungrateful task to be undertaken. Nevertheless, a reflection upon 
how the issue in question, namely the relation of the self to its ultimate other, has been thought 
and dealt (or not) throughout the history, may offer certain useful insights. Contemporary culture 
is a necessary background that has a very important role. In that sense, “Äkta människor” is a 
constitutive part of manufacture of consent to a potential posthuman future. It is also an evident 
about the moment in which the future is thought. However, unambiguous and straightforward 
solutions to issues that arise with anticipation have to be avoided since they may as well appear 
as double edge swords in a sense that they could be seen as several steps back rather than 
advancement.  
 Nevertheless, semiotization and deconstruction seem to offer suitable tools for redrawing 
of the boundaries and for remodeling of the core of the self – the two necessary processes for the 
coexistence with the new ultimate other to be possible. A reflection on how other disciplines 
from the scope of cultural studies (gender, animal, queer studies, conception of subaltern and 
similar) have dealt an issue together with semiotization and deconstruction of notions such as 
community, hospitality, being(-with), can spare time and efforts by pointing to the common 
mistakes and wrong paths that could be taken, and especially can save from all the suffering the 
previous others have gone through.  
 Deleuze’s and Guattari's quote above suggests for subjectivity to become nomadic, to be 
that which is all about leaving and letting (go): leaving places, (stable) identities, strict and rigid 
categories and modes of being, letting the other remain the other in a sense that its strangeness 
will rather be embraced than reshaped into that which fits to the self; letting the other remain 
multiplicity, and embracing a community (or relation) with the other as being conditioned by the 
impossibility of its realization. Being that is being-with (the other) is nothing but leaving and 
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letting go, sometimes only to return after  passing the full circle or after getting lost in labyrinths. 
Being-with is nothing but being inextricably intertwined, nothing but irreducible plurality, it only 
implies a self that is always necessary constituted as broken. It is nothing but offering the core of 
the self to the other and to the world, nothing but being exposed, vulnerable, unprotected. 
Offering unconditional hospitality to the radically different other is nothing but offering to 
unconditionally embrace it, to give everything and not to expect anything in return.  
 Being-with the other is nothing but crossing of boundaries and limitations, trespassing to 
foreign and even forbidden territories. And when it comes to the self and the other – transhuman 
and posthuman, and all different (unthinkable) sorts of otherness – the purpose of boundaries, 
limits and walls is not to protect nor to save, since there is nothing from which self should be 
protected or preserved. The purpose of boundaries and walls is to mure and to wall up, they exist 
for those who are not mured or walled up to hit the wall and to strike limitations. When 
boundaries and limitations are present in an initial event of the encounter with the other, the very 
event may be seen as a limitation itself. And an event that has begun with a limitation continues 
to develop in a limited way; the limitation disables any further events and everything happens in 
accordance with the initial limitation – nothing really happens, being-with is deprived of events. 
Being(-with) is in this case composed of impossibilities, obstacles and discouragements, weaved 
of the innumerable multiplicity of limits. Both “I” and the other are then boundaries, all identities 
and every territory then become boundaries and unbridgeable gaps. Limitations and boundaries 
thus mediate and interfere, and relations between the self and the other are then always such – 
interfered with, mediated, limited, distanced; deterritorialization and following of lines of flight 
is almost impossible in such a relation. Mêlée and penetrations are impossible in a situation that 
begins as limited and in which the Other is approached as radically different, foreign and 
separate. The relation between the self and the other thus remains separate, opposite, solitary, 
intangible.  
 Being-with a radically different entity and offering unconditional hospitality to the 
posthuman arrivant that has no shape, no form, whose essence is not graspable and whose 
chronotopes are incomprehensible, implies events that are rather seen as ruptures, explosions, 
ends of worlds. And everything necessarily gets released at the end of the world, in an 
apocalypse of all limits and the catastrophe of every identity. The cataclysm of the coded, 
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territorialized, mured world opens up new unstable, unsteady worlds of intensive and nomadic 
merging(s). That is the only kind of world in which being-with is possible: worlds through which 
one flies like a Deleuzian line of flight, but also not necessarily worlds of pure pleasure. Being-
with and unconditional hospitality to the ultimate other only happen in worlds full of horrors, 
abysses and falls; in the same worlds that are made of pure emotions, worlds where the exploded 
self has transformed into “a flock of desires, a pile of emotions, screams and breaths” (Arsić, 
Bajić 1995: 162).  
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Summary in Estonian 
 
Radikaalse erinevuse semiotisatsiooni poole: transhumanismi püüdlus 
muutuda posthumanismiks 
 
Erinevate distsipliinide jaoks, mis tekkisid humanitaarteaduste vallas XX sajandi vältel, on 
teistsuguse (võõrasuse) kontsept üheks uurimise põhifookuseks. Üks kasvavalt populaarsemaid 
nende seast on transhumanism, mille põhifookuseks on inimkeha ja inimese kognitiivsete 
võimete prandamine uute ja arenevate tehnoloogiade abil.Transhumanistlikud püüdlused inimelu 
arendada on saanud teemaks bioeetilistes ja neuroeetilistes aruteludes. Nii nagu mitmed teisedki 
valdkonnad, tegeleb transhumanism radikaalse erinevuse küsimusega.   
 Ehkki transhumanismi on distsipliinina aina populaarsem, puudub sellel siiani korralikult 
välja arendatud ja standardiseeritud terminoloogia ja metodoloogia, mistõttu on käesoleva töö 
üheks fookuseks sellesuunaline kriitiline analüüs. Selle distsipliiniga, mis on huvitatud inimelu 
arendamisest biotehnoloogia, nanotehnoloogia, kognitiiv- ja neuroteaduste saavutuste abil, käib 
humanismiga sarnaselt (mõistega transhuman) kaasas üleolek elu muude vormide suhtes. 
Transhumanism lähtub paljuski humanistlikest, universaalsele kehtivusele pretendeerivatest 
väärtustest nagu instrumentaalne ja valgustatud mõistus, mis aga on üha enam kriitika alla 
sattunud ja millega käib kaasas hirm (radikaalse) teisega kohtumise ees. Nii mõnedki teoreetikud 
kordavad olemasolevaid mõttemustreid, mis on postuleeritud mõningate varasemate 
koolkondade ja distsipliinite poolt, rõhutades eriti teistsuguse pühitsemise vajadust, mis osutub 
aga samuti problemaatiliseks nagu tema eituski. 
Keskendudes konkreetsele dialoogile Rootsi ulme/draamaseriaalis „Äkta Människor”, mis 
aastate 2012 ja 2013 jooksul on saavutatud suurt populaarsust kogu maailmas, püüab käesolev 
magistritöö kaardistada  transhumanismi probleeme kaasaja kultuuri kontekstis. 
 Käesolev töö kutsub üles radikaalse teistsuguse semiotisatsioonile, piirde ja mina tuuma 
avamisele, eesmärgiga pakkuda tingimusteta külalislahkust radikaalse teisele, transhuman isele – 
posthuman teisele. Ta on ülekutse mõista kogukonda teistmoodi, nii et see sisaldaks radikaalselt 
erinevat teist, mis ise on aga pidevas tekkimisprotsessis; ülekutse mõista Olemist kui koos-
  
 
Olemist ja elamist kui kaasa-elamist. Ta on väljakutse antropotsentrismi vastu ja katse vabaneda 
mitmete valgustusajast pärit väärtuste kütkeist, üleskutse  transhumanismi muutumiseks 
posthumanismiks. 
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